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1. Introduction 1 
1. Introduction 
In December 2008 the Japanese economy was described as having “already entered a 
recession phase”, with declining exports, production rates and corporate profits and rising 
bankruptcy numbers (Cabinet Office 2008: 1). Japan is still to recover entirely from the burst 
of the economic bubble in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and the subsequent, so-called 
“lost decade”. In addition to the long lasting economic problems Japan is also facing a 
growing number of issues within its society like declining birth rates, the ageing population 
and phenomena like NEET, freeter, and hikikomori1. How is the Japanese government dealing 
with changing demands and requirements? Economic problems and social issues necessitate 
partly fundamental changes that have to be implemented by the government as soon as 
possible. Several initiatives have been taken, some of which are described in this thesis.  
The government committed itself to promote its economic and fiscal policies in three stages in 
order to safeguard people’s quality of life and economic soundness. In the short-run 
“’economic recovery’” is envisaged, the medium term goal is to achieve “’fiscal 
consolidation’”, and the medium- to long-term optimum is to realize “’economic growth 
through reforms’” (ibid.). In addition, the government announced to review its measures and 
expenditures and to modify unreasonable expenses. As part of the mid-term program, the 
government reiterated its intention to reform its administration in terms of sustainable cost 
sharing and balance of costs and benefits (ibid.: 2f.). The government plans to “’abolish what 
should be abolished and reform what should be reformed’” in order to fulfil the expectations 
the public has of it (ibid.: 4). It is clear that the public sector and its functions need to be 
improved to be able to support the economic and financial recovery, and thus help to tackle 
various problems in the Japanese society. Japan has seen a series of, more or less successful, 
reform attempts. Especially administrative reform efforts seem to have left barely more than 
disappointment (Campbell 2001: 111ff.). The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the impacts 
of and benefits from the continuous reform endeavours in the past decades for the public 
management and decentralization. The title of this thesis coincides with the main research 
                                                
1 The acronym NEET stands for ‚not in employment, education or training’ and describes people who either 
want to work but do not want to look for a job, or do not want to work at all. Freeter on the other hand are not 
interested in the traditional career path, but rather get around with part-time jobs. The number of freeter has 
more than doubled from roughly 1 million in 1992 to over 2 million in 2005 (Genda 2007: 23). Hikikomori is a 
phenomenon characterized by the refusal of all social contact and the withdrawal from society (Suwa and 
Hara 2007: 94).  
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question. The results are obtained through an extensive literature research and the analysis of 
data provided by several Japanese ministries, the Statistics Bureau and international 
organizations like the OECD and the United Nations. 
 
The following chapter shows the basic structure of the public sector in Japan and indicates 
some of its specific characteristics. The general structure of the Japanese government is 
described and the diverse functions and responsibilities at different levels of government are 
specified. The size of the government in Japan is analysed and compared to relevant OECD 
data. The Japanese government has taken several steps towards a smaller government in 
recent years. An overview of public sector reforms is given at the beginning of chapter 3, 
leading to the New Public Management movement and its implementation in Japan. The most 
recent measures of administrative reform in Japan are presented, and a description of two 
important, exemplary privatizations is given: the privatization of Japan National Railways in 
the 1980s and the privatization of the Japan Post in the last decade. The chapter closes with 
two initiatives towards a small government and the e-government trend. The fourth chapter 
deals with local governments and how they have tried to gain power and expand their fields of 
competences especially in the past two decades. The last chapter summarizes the main 
findings and gives an outlook on future challenges and research fields.   
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2. Government Structure 
Japan is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government. The government organs 
and their respective duties and responsibilities are stipulated in the constitution, which was 
put into effect May 3, 1947. A powerful central government and the subordinated levels of 
prefectures, municipalities and certain hybrid forms (presented in chapter 2.5.) characterize 
the vertical government structure in Japan. First, the organs and features on the national level 
and the size of government are described, followed by an overview of the two-tiered local 
government including the hybrid entities. The intergovernmental financial relations and the 
problematic nature of public debt are covered at the end of this chapter.  
2.1. The Emperor (??  tennō) 
With the enactment of the new constitution the Emperor lost most of his status. Article 1 
clearly states the new division of roles: the Emperor is “the symbol of the State and the unity 
of people”, he has no power related to government (Hayes 2005: 294). The sovereign power, 
by contrast, resides with the people. The Emperor still has duties, like the appointment of the 
Prime Minister as designated by the Diet (Article 6). Advised and approved by the Cabinet, 
he is to perform 10 acts listed in Article 7, including the “promulgation of amendments of the 
constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties”, “the convocation of the Diet”, or the 
“dissolution of the House of Representatives” (ibid.: 294). But usually he only represents 
Japan, meets foreign ambassadors or ministers, and performs ceremonial functions 
(ibid.,: 295.). The expenses for the Imperial Family and the Imperial Household Agency 
(IHA) are partly determined by law, amounting to 16,44 billion Yen2 (about 150 million Euro 
or 200 million US Dollar) in Fiscal Year3 (FY) 2012, allowances for Imperial Family 
members not included (The Imperial Household Agency 2012). Due to the fact that the 
Imperial Family is financed through public funds to some extend and the few functions 
exercised by the Emperor and the Imperial Family, there is an ongoing controversy whether 
the monarchy still has a right to exist or not. Despite this debate it is not to be expected that 
                                                
2 Except where noted otherwise values labelled with FY are converted with the exchange rates of April 1 (or the 
neareast availabe exchange rate) of the relevant year, and are based on the exchange rates retrieved from 
Bloomberg (2012a and 2012b).  
3 The Fiscal Year in Japan starts with April 1 and end on March 31.  
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the Imperial Family will cease to exist as the Emperor is and will be an emotional anchor for 
many Japanese in times of crisis, as for example the triple disaster in March 2011 has shown.   
2.2. Central Government 
Japan has a unitary government with a certain degree of decentralisation. A division of power 
in the horizontal structure characterizes the government system in Japan, as in many other 
countries. Figure 1 shows the three branches of the Japanese government: the Diet 
(Legislative), the Cabinet (Executive) and the Courts (Judicial). For the sake of completeness 
all three divisions are described below. The focus however lies on the description of the 
Cabinet and the Prime Minister.  
 
 
Figure 1: Division of Power - Government Branches in Japan  
Source: The Secretariat of the House of Representatives 2010 
 
Although the division of power is embedded in the constitution, the borders often seem to be 
blurred. While this is a highly interesting issue, common to many countries, it cannot be 
sufficiently addressed to in this paper. For further details see, for example, Itoh 2010: 248.  
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2.2.1. The Diet  (??  kokkai) 
The Diet is defined as the highest state power institution and the only legislative body. The 
bicameral parliament consists of the House of Representatives (??? shūgiin) and the 
House of Councillors (??? sangiin) (Hayes 2005: 300). Japanese citizens who are at 
least 20 years of age have the right to elect the members of both houses (The Secretariat of the 
House of Representatives 2010: 11).  
The House of Representatives – the Lower House – consists of 480 Members with elections 
taking place every four years. The election system combines two approaches: the single-seat 
constituencies and the proportional representation, whereby 300 and 180 members are elected, 
respectively (ibid.: 11). The House of Councillors – the Upper House – counts 242 Members 
with an office term of six years. Half of the members are elected every three years. In 
total, 146 members are elected by plural-seat prefectural constituencies, whereas 96 are 
elected by the proportional representation (ibid.: 11). The two houses together wield the 
powers vested in the Diet by enacting laws, deciding over national finances, or designating 
the Prime Minister (ibid.: 12). Ackerman (2000: 635) observes that power is unequally 
distributed between the Lower and the Upper House, with the latter playing a significant but 
not the “dominant role“, which is why he calls it the “’one-and-a-half house solution’”.  
Hayes points out that the kokkai is not as independent as for example the United States 
Congress. He also claims that Japan lacks the system of checks and balances, although 
officially the opposite is argued. In fact the legislature, the cabinet and the bureaucracy would 
share the power. The role of the Diet is not decisive when it comes to initiating and refining 
public policy. Quite the contrary, „for all practical purposes it is limited to merely ‘rubber-
stamping’ decisions made elsewhere (Hayes 2005: 48).  
2.2.2. The Cabinet  (??  naikaku)  
Chapter V (Articles 65 – 75) of the constitution provides for the rules concerning the cabinet. 
Article 65 defines it as the executive branch. It consists of the prime minister as its head and 
other ministers of state, who must all be civilians, and is responsible to the diet as stated in 
Article 66. The number of ministers is not clearly determined in the constitution, but in the 
Cabinet Law which was enacted in 2001. Article 2 (2) limits the “Minister of State” to “not 
more than fourteen”, with the exception of “special circumstances” allowing for an increase to 
seventeen (Cabinet Secretariat 2007). Functions to be performed by the cabinet “in addition to 
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other general administrative functions” are provided in Article 73. The list of duties includes 
faithfully administering the law, conducting affairs of state, managing foreign affairs, 
concluding treaties, administering the civil service, preparing and presenting the budget to the 
Diet, enacting Cabinet orders and deciding on amnesty (Hayes 2005: 303ff.). 
2.2.3. The Prime Minister (??????  naikaku sōri daijin) 
The prime minister (PM), as head of government, has to be civilian. He is “designated from 
among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet” (Article 67). He appoints and 
removes the ministers of state (Article 68). Furthermore he “submits bills, reports on general 
national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision over 
various administrative branches” (Article 72). 
 
Since 1945 until July 2012 Japan has seen 34 PMs, during the same period there have been 14 
PMs in the UK and 12 presidents in the USA (Cabinet Secretariat 2012a, The British Prime 
Minister’s Office 2012, The White House 2012)4. Table 1 shows a list of the post war PMs 
and the length of their respective terms in office in days as well as their party membership. 
There are remarkable differences in the length of prime ministerial tenure, ranging from 
only 54 days (Higashikuni in 1945) to 2.798 days (Satō 1968-1972). The average time in 
office amounted to 709 days, i.e. roughly two years5. There are a few notable PMs such as 
Yoshida, Satō, Nakasone and Koizumi who have served for longer than average. The majority 
of the past PMs have been in office for less than the average. With a regular tenure of four 
years there should only have been 16 PMs, in fact there have been 33 changes in this position 
since the end of World War II.  
 
Table 1: Prime Ministers of Japan (1945-2011) 
Name of PM In office from Days in office Party 
Higashikuni Aug. 17, 1945 54     
Shidehara Oct. 9, 1945  226  
 Yoshida May 22, 1946 368 JLP 
                                                
4  Prime ministers with separate terms are counted according to the number of their non-consecutive 
administrations, i.e. Yoshida Shigeru and Harold Wilson are counted twice. 
5 The incumbent PM Noda has not been taken into account in the calculation. 
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Name of PM In office from Days in office Party 
Katayama May 24, 1947 292 JSP 
Ashida Mar. 10, 1948 220 DP 
Yoshida Oct. 15, 1948 2 251 DLP/LP 
Hatoyama Dec. 10, 1954 745 JDP/LDP 
Ishibashi Dec. 23, 1956 65 LDP 
Kishi Feb. 25, 1957 1 241 LDP 
Ikeda July 19, 1960 1 575 LDP 
Satō Nov. 9, 1964 2 798 LDP 
Tanaka July 7, 1972 886 LDP 
Miki Dec. 9, 1974 747 LDP 
Fukuda Dec. 24, 1976 714 LDP 
Ōhira Dec. 7, 1978 554 LDP 
Suzuki July 17, 1980 864 LDP 
Nakasone Nov. 27, 1982 1.806 LDP 
Takeshita Nov. 6, 1987 576 LDP 
Uno June 3, 1989 69 LDP 
Kaifu Aug. 10, 1989 818 LDP 
Miyazawa Nov. 5, 1991 644 LDP 
Hosokawa Aug. 9, 1993 263 JNP 
Hata April 28, 1994 64 JRP 
Murayama June 30, 1994 561 SDPJ 
Hashimoto Jan. 11, 1996 932 LDP 
Obuchi July 30, 1998 616 LDP 
Mori April 5, 2000 387 LDP 
Koizumi April 26, 2001 1.980 LDP 
Abe Sep. 26, 2006 366 LDP 
Fukuda Sep. 26, 2007 364 LDP 
Asō Sep. 24, 2008  357 LDP 
Hatoyama Sep. 16, 2009 265 DPJ 
Kan June 8, 2010 451 DPJ 
Noda Sep. 2, 2011  DPJ 
Sources: adapted from Cabinet Secretariat 2012a, McCargo, 2004: 95 
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It is commonly agreed on, that one of the major reasons for the high fluctuation rate in this 
powerful political position lies within the structure of the Japanese political parties, namely 
the factions (habatsu) within the parties. Especially the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
which has been in power over decades, is known for its strong factional structure6. Although 
officially not existing since their abolishment in 1994 (Derichs 2003: 169) according to Neary 
(2002: 110) 
 
“[m]ost LDP members of parliament belong to one of five or six factions, each of 
which at any one time will have between 40 and 100 members. The leader of the LDP 
will usually be the leader of one of the largest factions and have the support of two or 
more, such that he can command a majority in his party.”  
 
As Derichs (2003: 169) points out the head of government has to consider the power relations 
within his party, especially when nominating his cabinet. As he is dependent on the support of 
the factions he cannot chose the ministers of state solely with regards to their professional 
competences. Derichs also points out that the demand for leadership competences of top-
ranking politicians is repeatedly expressed. As a reaction, the functions of the PM and the 
cabinet have been beefed up. Consequently it is now possible for the PM to contribute more 
actively to the policy formulation by presenting policy proposals to the cabinet. The question 
remains unanswered if the PM now has enough room for action in order to win out over the 
traditionally strong bureaucracy and the “old guard” in his own party (Derichs 2003: 169f.).  
 
Pre-electoral coalitions (PEC) did not play a significant role in the political system as it was 
dominated by the LDP for decades. A list of elections in Japan from 1946 to 2002 indicates 
only one election (in 1993) where PEC was observed (Golder 2006: 161). In this case the 
government was formed by two PECs. 
2.2.4. The Courts (???  saibansho) 
Judicial Power is given to the Supreme Courts as laid down in Article 76 of the constitution. 
The establishment of subordinated courts by law and the prohibition to give any “final judicial 
power” to the Executive is also regulated there (Hayes 2005: 305).  The Supreme Court Grand 
                                                
6  For further details concerning the factional system and the nature of the LDP see for example 
Neary, 2002: 67ff., 100ff.; McCargo, 2004: 94, 113ff. or Stockwin, 2003: 89f., 148ff. 
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Bench involves fifteen justices, including the chief justice appointed by the emperor. The 
cabinet recommends the chief justice and appoints the fourteen remaining judges. The Petty 
Bench consists of only five judges and deals with routine review cases other than 
constitutional issues, which are left to the Grand Bench (ibid.: 63). The next level comprises 
eight High Courts according to the regions of Japan7. The District Courts (through more 
than 200 branches) operate on the third level with about one in every prefecture, except for 
Hokkaidō with four. Summary Courts work on the lowest level with judges comparable to the 
“American justices of the peace” (ibid.: 64). Family Courts are structurally found on the same 
level as the District Courts, dealing with “domestic complaints […] and juvenile matters” 
(ibid.: 64). For further details on the court system and jurisdiction see for example 
Hayes 2005: 64ff. or Derichs 2003: 171f.  
2.3. Bureaucracy 
According to Mieczkowski (1991: 3) bureaucracy can cover the public, as well as private 
sector. He limits the definition of bureaucrats “to the upper echelons of the administrative 
apparatus, to the policy decision-makers, and people with power to make personnel 
decisions”. Bureaucracy in the Japanese sense was traditionally associated with an elite 
status8, which it gradually lost due to failings from within its structure (e.g. corruption 
scandals, policy failure) and “the rise of hereditary politicians” (Goldfinch 2006: 590), just to 
name a few causes. However, Johnson (1985: 154 cited in Hayes 2005: 58) once said that 
“[T]he politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule.“. The Japanese bureaucracy still has the 
reputation to be very powerful and highly respected while being comparatively small and 
economical (McCargo 2004: 103, Hayes 2005: 58).  
 
Article 15 (1) of the Japanese constitution grants the people to “have the inalienable right to 
choose their public officials and dismiss them”. It further specifies in (2) “all public officials 
are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof” (Hayes 2005: 296). As 
Derichs (2003: 167) argues, the structure and power of the bureaucracy originate from the 
                                                
7 Japan counts eight regions: Hokkaidō, Tōhoku, Kantō, Chūbu, Kansai, Chūgoku, Shikoku, and Kyūshū.  
8 Goldfinch (2006: 589) indicates that the bureaucracy in Japan was the only „legitimate elite group“ after World 
War II. Nakamura (2005: 21f.) points out that bureaucrats in the Meiji period, especially those who graduated 
from the Tokyo University, were considered to be more important than legislators. Furuhashi (1999: 14, cited in 
Nakamura 2005: 23) specifies that the „elite corps of the political establishment“ consisted of only about 10.000 
of the, back then, 4 million civil servants.  
2. Government Structure 10 
Meiji period when the idea of the civil servant as a servant of the state and the principles of 
strict recruitment rules and the career path according to seniority were put into practice. Hayes 
(2005: 58) states that World War II and the subsequent occupation did not affect the Japanese 
bureaucracy in an essential way (see also Choi 2007: 932, Derichs 2003: 167). McCargo 
(2004: 105) points out that bureaucrats draft most of the legislation, not politicians, as one 
would expect. According to his line of reasoning bureaucrats have “quasi-legislative powers” 
as they drafted 80% of all legislation recently passed and in addition issued ordinances that 
“outnumber laws by around 9:1” (ibid.: 107). Hayes (2005: 58) indicates that an important 
source of power lies in the issuance of ordinances as well as ministerial communications.  
Probably one of the most famous features of the Japanese world of employment is the myth of 
life-long employment. In the private sector only a small share of employees benefitted from 
this privilege. In the public sector it is “a customary practice” that ensures loyalty to the 
“parent organization”, instead of to the public, but it also causes “major ill effects” such as 
departmentalism (United Nations 1997: 11). In addition to life-long employment civil 
servants enjoy “security of tenure” both on the local and on the national level as indicated by 
Stevens (2004: 2). The principle of amakudari 9 ??? (descent from heaven) is another 
unique characteristic of the bureaucracy in Japan whereby senior civil servants receive at 
large a “plum retirement job” (McCargo 2004: 106). This method was (very) common until 
about 2001 (as indicated by Noble 2011: 259) and was reduced from then on, especially by 
the DPJ when it took over power in 2009. The National Public Service Act (Article 103 (2)) 
states that civil servants are not allowed to “accept or assume a position with a profit-making 
enterprise with a close connection to any agency of the State“, thereby somehow regulating 
the amakudari (National Personnel Authority 2006: 35). Colignon and Usui (2003: 11) 
describe several strategies for bureaucrats to continue their careers after retiring from civil 
service in different areas: amakudari as the move to the private sector, yokosuberi ??? as 
a “sideslip” to a public corporation, or wataridori ??? who, like “migratory birds”, cover 
longer distances from public and/or private institutions, i.e. first take a step from the 
bureaucracy to the public sector, followed by another step into the private sector. The fourth 
path described leads bureaucrats into the political sphere, known as seikai tenshin ???? 
(ibid.). amakudari are said to have played an essential role within the “iron triangle”, known 
                                                
9 The specific feature of amakudari and its implications have generated an enormous amount of literature, for 
further details see, for example, Colignon and Usui 2003. 
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as a synonym for the strong and influential relations between politicians, bureaucrats and their 
counterparts in the business world (ibid.: 13). Neary (2002: 116) explains the disproportionate 
influence exerted by bureaucrats over the spheres of economy and society by the use of 
“’administrative guidance’”, which allowed ministries (best known example: the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, abbreviated MITI) to determine, for example, the amount of 
production in a certain sector or the share of exports. The local authorities were also able to 
exercise power over their clients to a certain extend. During the 1950s and 1960s this was 
common practice, but over the years criticism rose until finally in 1994 a law was enacted to 
limit the “arbitrary nature of administrative guidance” (ibid.). There is no doubt that such a 
system will not lead to optimal efficiency. By the 1990s the strong bureaucratic influence was 
increasingly seen with criticism. Civil servants were involved in several cases of corruption, 
they were held responsible for “the bubble economy and its disastrous aftermath”, and more 
and more believed to be unable to find a solution for the problems of the Japanese economy 
(Conlignon and Usui 2003: 48). “Public trust” is described to be the “currency of the 
bureaucracy” (ibid.: 184), which it was continuously losing as it was more and more 
perceived as being dysfunctional.  
The government has put some efforts in the reform of the civil service system, which is aimed 
at regaining the public trust on the one hand, and providing for more efficiency and 
effectiveness on the other hand. It includes the revision of the system of recruitment 
examinations (National Personnel Authority 2010: 10), the gradual increase of the 
“mandatory retirement age to 65” (ibid.: 27), and modifications of the treatment of “elderly 
employees” (ibid.). Ito et al. (2006) summarize three important points: (1) an enhanced 
personnel exchange between the private and public sector, (2) the revision of the “personnel 
management system”, and (3) amendments in order to prevent amakudari and improve 
transparency of the “post-retirement” job-search.  
2.4. Size of Government 
The size of the government can be expressed in several ways. The following section 
comprises two approaches to show the size of the Japanese government in terms of the share 
of public revenues and expenditures and the share of government employment. The Japan 
Statistical Yearbook and the Statistical Handbook of Japan in the latest issues as well as 
OECD data serve as major data basis for this chapter.  
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2.4.1. Share of Public Revenues and Expenditures 
The national budget is divided into the general and special accounts, and the budget for 
government-affiliated (GA) agencies as shown in table 2 below. The column “Net Total” 
shows the net total values after deduction of duplications of the general and special accounts.  
The figures for FY 2010 are final estimates of December 2010, whereas the values for 
FY 2011 and the GA agencies expenditure for FY 2010 show the initial budget (Statistics 
Bureau 2012d). 
Table 2: Revenue and Expenditure of National Government Finance (billion Yen) 
FY General Account Special Accounts Net Total GA agencies 
Revenue     
  1995 80.557 276.814 193.858 7.657 
  2000 93.361 341.146 234.670 7.019 
  2005 89.000 452.141 283.202 4.710 
  2007 84.553 395.920 247.230 2.604 
  2008 89.208 387.740 235.971 1.825 
  2009 107.114 377.893 246.280 1.277 
  2010 100.669 402.426 249.962 2.200 
  2011 92.412 400.020 232.687 1.843 
Expenditure     
  1995 75.939 232.466 155.325 7.536 
  2000 89.321 305.776 199.466 6.988 
  2005 85.520 401.184 230.183 4.103 
  2007 81.843 353.283 203.515 2.065 
  2008 84.697 359.198 204.781 1.785 
  2009 100.973 348.060 212.710 1.530 
  2010 100.531 361.591 211.646 3.135 
  2011 92.412 384.885 220.275 2.613 
Source: Statistics Bureau 2012c 
 
The revenues in the General Account amounted to 92.412 billion Yen in FY 2011 
(equalling 462,8 billion Euro or 1.099,4 billion US Dollars) and were obtained by government 
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bond issues (47,9%)10, tax and stamps revenues (44,3%), and other revenues (7,8%) as 
illustrated in figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Composition of Revenue and Expenditure of General Account Budget (FY 2011) 
Source: Statistics Bureau 2012c 
 
The revenues from tax and stamps are further divided into income tax (14,6%), consumption 
tax (11,0%), corporation tax (8,4%), and other taxes stamp revenues (10,2%). On the 
expenditure side the largest proportion (58,5%) is dedicated to general expenditures for social 
                                                
10 The share of government bond issues is relatively high and indicates that the public sector is facing severe 
challenges in terms of sustainable finance. Japan has seen increasing bond dependency ratios since the 1990s 
when the values where found around 10%. A chart published by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) shows a ratio 
of 49% for FY 2012 (Ministry of Finance 2011a: 3).  
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security (31,1%), education and science (6,0%), public works (5,4%), national 
defence (5,2%), and others (10,9%). The national debt service consumes 23,3%, whereas the 
local allocation tax grants and others account for 18,2% of the expenditures. Revenues in 
table 2 exceed expenditures in all years displayed. As Japan is said to have ever increasing 
deficits it is clear that the figures only represent one section of national government finances.  
Another set of data provided by the Statistical Bureau of Japan gives an overview of the 
economic and financial situation in Japan in FY 2010. According to these statistics the fiscal 
sector showed revenues of the “General Government Operations” of almost 150 trillion Yen, 
an amount equal to about 1,18 trillion Euro or 1,60 trillion US Dollar, and expenditures of 
roughly 190 trillion Yen (about 1,5 trillion Euro or 2,03 trillion US Dollar), resulting in a 
deficit of more than 40 trillion Yen (Statistics Bureau 2012d). The central government 
operations show revenues of 14,26 trillion Yen (130 billion Euro or 173,6 billion US Dollar) 
in the first quarter of FY 2012, opposed by 25,41 trillion Yen of expenditures (232 billion 
Euro or 309 billion US Dollar) (ibid.). The trend towards a deficit continues. 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(2011: 59) the revenues of the general government in Japan increased from 31,41% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 to 33,51% in 2007 and to 34,96% in 2009 as shown in 
figure 3 (a footnote indicates, that this value is to be dated 2008 instead of 2009).   
 
Figure 3: General Government Revenues (% of GDP) 
Source: OECD 2011 
 
Japan is on a comparable level with nations like Switzerland (34,95%), Spain (34,67%) and 
Ireland (34,52%). The OECD average amounted to 41,39%. Norway showed the highest level 
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with 56,18%, the lowest levels were observed in Chile with 21,25% and Indonesia 
with 16,50%.  
 
 
Figure 4: General Government Expenditures (% of GDP) 
Source: OECD 2011 
 
On the expenditures side Japan showed decreasing figures from 39,05% in 2000 to 35,90% 
in 2007 (see figure 4). The value for 2009 presents an increase to 37,08% of the GDP. The 
OECD average stood at 41,94% in 2000 and remained virtually unchanged with 41,31% 
in 2007. In 2009 an increased rate of 46,24% can be observed (OECD 2011: 65).  
2.4.2. Share of Government Employment 
The number of government employees varies depending on which public services and level of 
government are taken into account. However, the overall trend shows continuously declining 
numbers over the past years. Table 3 presents the latest figures available from the Japan 
Statistical Yearbook 2012 issued by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (MIC). These values are assumed to reflect the number of general 
service employees.  
Table 3: Government Employees (1995-2009) 
FY 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 
Employees 819.599 799.855 633.21511 362.252 357.787 346.519 
Source: Statistics Bureau 2012b 
 
                                                
11 Employees of Japan Post are included in this figure although it was planned to transfer them to the “Postal 
Public Corporation” from 2003 on (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012b).   
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The massive decline from FY 2005 with 633.215 employees to FY 2007 with 362.252 
employees can be explained by the subtraction of the Japan Post staff that counted 261.937 
employees at the end of FY 2004 (Japan Center for Economic Research 2005: 1). Table 4 
shows a total of 662.000 national civil servants – 301.000 in the special service and 361.000 
in the general service.  
Table 4: Size of Central Government (2008) 
Type of Service Employees 
National Civil Service 662.000  
   Special Service 301.000 
        (Deputy) Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, Ambassadors 400 
        Judges, Court Officials 26.000 
        National Diet Officials 4.000 
        Self-Defence Force 271.000 
   General Service 361.000 
        General Office Staff 296.000 
        Prosecutors 5.000 
        Government Enterprise Officials 5.000 
        Special Independent Administrative Agency Officials 58.000 
Source: adapted from Nakamura and Kikuchi 2011 
 
Table 5 below presents the distribution of the national government employees attributed 
directly to institutions like ministries, commissions, agencies and the like. In FY 2000 there 
was a total of 41 agencies with 496.083 employees. The overall number of employees shows 
a decline to 279.197 in FY 2009, a reduction of 43,72% compared to FY 2000. Some 
institutions, like the Postal Services Agency or the Food Agency, included in FY 2000, 
dropped out of the counting from FY 2005 on, thus lowering the total number. Other 
organizations, like the Cabinet Secretariat or the Fair Trade Commission, show a considerable 
increase. However, a greater part of the agencies enlisted reduced their staff. Front-runner in 
this context is the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology with a 
sharp drop from over 135.000 employees in FY 2000 to roughly 2000 in FY 2005. The first 
figure includes „national schools / universities and inter-university research institutes 
(Statistics Bureau 2012b). In 2001 the central ministries and agencies were reorganized (as 
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described in chapter 3.4.2. below) and in 2004 „national universities and inter-universitary 
research institutes“ fell out of this counting as they were restructured to corporations (ibid.).  
Table 5: Government Employees by Agency  
Agency / FY 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total 496.083 301.719 299.319 296.364 291.414 279.197 
Board of Audit 1.230 1.280 1.270 1.270 1.258 1.261 
Cabinet Secretariat 338 608 607 612 620 637 
Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau 72 72 72 70 71 72 
National Personnel 
Authority 683 702 706 713 715 728 
Cabinet Office 2.202 2.347 2.333 2.337 2.402 2.324 
IHA 1.036 1.014 1.001 991 993 985 
Fair Trade 
Commission 561 665 680 692 727 721 
National Public 
Safety 
Commission 
7.774 7.833 7.855 7.918 7.899 8.018 
Financial Services 
Agency 743 1.170 1.208 1.230 1.297 1.281 
Consumer Affairs 
Agency - - - - - 181 
MIC 6.455 5.069 5.004 4.932 4.896 5.110 
Environmental 
Disputes 
Coordination 
Commission 
38 38 38 38 38 35 
Fire-Defence 
Agency 130 130 160 160 160 161 
Ministry of Justice 46.773 47.115 47.086 47.338 47.399 47.694 
Public Security 
Commission 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Public Security 
Investigation 
Agency 
1.627 1.480 1.504 1.504 1.503 1.505 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 5.207 5.343 5.303 5.433 5.452 5.561 
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Agency / FY 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MoF 14.658 15.130 15.076 15.089 15.180 15.403 
National Tax 
Agency 57.139 56.424 56.373 56.079 56.148 56.583 
Ministry of 
Education, 
Culture, Sports, 
Science & 
Technology 
135.107 1.953 1.956 1.954 1.961 1.960 
Agency for 
Cultural Affairs 708 240 237 233 239 238 
Ministry of Health, 
Labour & Welfare 80.836 37.855 37.458 37.195 37.464 38.201 
Central Labour 
Relations 
Commission 
113 94 112 114 115 112 
Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
Forestry & 
Fisheries 
21.483 23.325 22.689 21.369 20.027 18.832 
Forestry Agency 1.395 553 539 521 516 500 
Fisheries Agency 2.037 939 936 942 923 917 
Ministry of 
Economy, Trade & 
Industry 
7.993 4.445 4.383 4.371 4.330 4.327 
Agency of Natural 
Resources & 
Energy 
1.056 1.239 1.211 1.195 1.191 1.189 
Patent Office 2.482 2.428 2.397 2.409 2.398 2.419 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency 188 195 200 186 185 194 
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, 
Transport & 
Tourism  
49.015 44.993 44.306 43.577 42.850 42.488 
Japan Tourism 
Agency - - - - 90 98 
Japan 
Meteorological 
Agency 
6.066 5.838 5.754 5.658 5.555 5.478 
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Agency / FY 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Japan Transport 
Safety Board - - - - 174 173 
Japan Coast Guard 12.133 12.302 12.240 12.427 12.501 12.583 
Ministry of the 
Environment 1.119 1.142 1.172 1.190 1.185 1.195 
Ministry of 
Defence 86 31 30 30 31 29 
Social Insurance 
Agency 17.121 17.439 17.168 16.292 12.917 - 
Labour Relations 
Commission for 
Seafarers 
51 51 26 65 - - 
Marine Accidents 
Inquiry Agency 241 233 225 226 - - 
Postal Services 
Agency 162 - - - - - 
Mint Bureau 16 - - - - - 
Printing Bureau 16 - - - - - 
Food Agency 9.989 - - - - - 
Source: adapted from Statistics Bureau 2012b 
 
Compared with data provided by the OECD (2010: 103) Japan shows figures well below the 
average for employment in general government and public corporations. Figure 5 shows a 
comparison of OECD countries and their government employment as a share of the labour 
force (ibid.).  
 
Figure 5: Government Employment as Share of Labour Force (2000 and 2008) 
Source: OECD 2011 
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The values range from 5,7% in Korea to 29,3% in Norway. The share in Japan decreased 
from 7,7% in 2000 to 6,7% in 2008. The OECD average slightly declined from 15,2% in 2000 
to 15,0% in 2008.   
 
Regardless of whether the government size is measured by the ratio of revenues and 
expenditures as percentage of GDP or by the share of government employment the Japanese 
government is smaller than the OECD average.  
2.5. Local Authorities 
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in Articles 92 to 95 of Chapter VIII of the 
constitution. The Local Autonomy Law enacted in 1947 specifies the prefectures  (regional) 
and municipalities (local) as the basis of the local government (Council of Local Authorities 
for International Relations 2005: 2). There is a distinction between ordinary (prefectures and 
municipalities) and special (special ward, municipal cooperative, property ward, and local 
development corporation) local government (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2010: 6). Only the former are described in this thesis, details on the special local 
government can be found in the brochure on local government mainly serving as the primary 
source of information for this section (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2010: 8f.) 
 
Japan is subdivided into 47 prefectures (–ken), four of which show special characteristics: the 
cities of Tōkyō (with the suffix –tō), Kyōto and Osaka (with the suffix –fu), and Hokkaidō 
(the only region, with the suffix –dō) (McCargo 2005: 101). As of April 1, 2011 there are 786 
cities, 754 towns and 184 villages as illustrated in figure 6 below. The 23 wards of Tōkyō 
enjoy a special status. In addition to ordinary cities (with more than 30.000 inhabitants and 
“an urban appearance”) there are also “designated cities, core cities, and special cities, with all 
three having enhanced powers” (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2010: 6f.).  
 
Designated cities need to have more than 1 million inhabitants or at least 700.000 and the 
expectation to reach the necessary size of population “in the near future” (ibid.: 7). Currently 
there are 19 designated cities that have similar power like the prefectures as they are 
consigned with functions “in 19 areas such as social welfare, public health, and urban 
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planning, […] management of national road and compulsory education.” (ibid.: 7f.). These 
cities are further divided into wards (see figure 6). Core cities by contrast are required to have 
at least 300.000 inhabitants (ibid.: 8).  
 
 
Figure 6: Government System by Level  
Source: Statistics Bureau 2012a 
 
Core and designated cities are comparable in their scope of action with the former dealing 
with the same matter except for those, “that are more efficiently and uniformly handled by 
prefectures across their broader jurisdictions” (ibid.). Special cities as the third category need 
a population of 200.000 or more inhabitants. Their delegated functions are comparable to 
those of core cities (ibid.). According to the MIC there are 41 core and 40 special cities as of 
April 1, 2012 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2012a). 
  
Both legislative and executive institutions are established on the local level. There are 
assemblies on the prefectural and councils on the municipal level dealing in the former 
category, and the heads of prefectures (governors) and municipalities (mayors) and a range of 
other administrative bodies (e.g. for education, public safety) in the latter (Council on Local 
Authorities for International Relations 2010: 9ff.). The direct election of governors and 
mayors is seen as a significant step towards local democracy (Foljanty-Jost 2009: 8). 
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Neary (2002: 149f.) indicates the following six general functions carried out by local 
authorities:  
- local infrastructure 
- welfare facilities (elderly, handicapped, children) 
- education and culture 
- health and environment 
- local industry, forestry, agriculture, fishing 
- “citizen services”. 
 
Prefectures deal with matters covering wider areas such as “prefectural roads, harbors, forest 
and river conservancy, public health centers, vocational training, [and] police”. They also 
carry out affairs concerning the coordination and communication with the municipalities 
(mainly support functions) and “supplementary affairs for municipalities” in the fields of 
education, culture and health (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2010: 16).   
 
Municipalities on the other side are entrusted with matters more closely related to their 
citizens. The Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) (2010: 16f.) 
mentions five categories of affairs such as administrative fundamentals (family register and 
the like), safety and health functions (supply of water and waste management, for example), 
welfare functions (insurances), “urban development plans”, and “the establishment and 
management of various facilities” (halls, day care centres, schools, and so on). CLAIR 
indicates that there are many other functions performed by the local authorities, in fact 
covering “all internal administrative areas” with the exception of diplomatic, defence, 
“currency or justice” affairs, as they are carried out on the central government level 
(ibid.: 17). In order to complete the manifold duties prefectures and municipalities need 
extensive human and financial resources. The financial relations between local and central 
government are described in the subsequent section. The number of employees on the local 
level shows a downward trend, although the drop is not as distinct as on the national level. 
From initially 3.278.000 employees in FY 1995 the figure sank by approximately 14% 
to 2.817.000 in FY 2010 as presented in Table 6 below.  
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Table 6: Number of Employees on Local Level (1995-2010 in thousands)   
FY 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 
Employees 3.278  3.201  3.040  2.901  2.857  2.817  
Source: Statistics Bureau 2012b 
 
Table 7 shows an overview of local government employees by type of services in FY 2010. 
More than one third was working in the education system. Roughly 20% were handling 
general administrative services. Slightly more than 13% were employed in the fields of social 
welfare and public hygiene, just about the same as in the public enterprise account sector. 
Police and fire service accounted for about 10% and almost 6% respectively.  
Table 7: Local Government Employees by Type of Administrative Services (2010) 
Type of Services Number Employees 
Education 1.064.320 
General administrative services 559.785 
Social welfare and public hygiene 377.166 
Police 281.309 
Fire service 157.754 
Public enterprise account sector 373.541 
   Hospitals 204.181 
   Water and sewage 79.456 
   Transportation 27.313 
TOTAL 2.813.875 
Source: Statistics Bureau 2012a 
 
The share of government employees working on the sub-central levels amounted to 85,28% in 
2008, whereas 14,72% were found working on the central level (OECD 2011: 105). In this 
regard Japan is comparable to Australia, which shows a similar distribution. In contrast, 
countries like Turkey, Ireland or New Zealand are characterized by an exact opposite 
distribution with over 85% central and less than 15% sub-central government employees. 
Concerning the share of central government staff in Japan a remarkable decline from 25,2% 
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in 2000 to 14,7% in 2008 can be observed. Finland, with 25,7% in 2000 only decreased its 
share to 24,0% in 2008 (ibid.).  
2.6. Financial Relations across Levels of Governments 
The Local Finance Law specifies the relationships between the central and local governments 
(Doi and Ihori 2009: 6). Thus, the central government is not in a position to alter 
responsibilities at its discretion. According to Doi and Ihori (2009: 201) the system of local 
finance is extremely centralized. Reasons for that are found in the Meiji period (the historical 
aspects are not further discussed; for details see Doi and Ihori 2009: 201f. or 
Neary 2002: 152).  
As Mochida (2001: 1) indicates the relation between levels of governments is characterized 
by “a vertical fiscal imbalance”, based on the three main attributes of   
 
- “centralized tax administration 
- decentralized provision of public services, and 
- dependence of local government on intergovernmental transfers.” 
 
The expenditures and revenues on the national level have already been outlined in 
chapter 2.4.1. Local governments have four major sources of income: local taxes, public 
loans, charges for goods and services provided, and resources made available by the central 
government. The financial equalisation system comprises features of a mixed system with a 
relatively high share of taxes directly imposed on the local levels. On average one third to half 
of the money disposable to local authorities comes from local taxes, whereas as much as two 
thirds are transferred by the central government (Neary 2002: 151).  
 
CLAIR (2010: 17) illustrates the allocation of financial resources of central and local 
governments with FY 2006 figures as follows: The total tax revenue amounted to 90,6 trillion 
Yen (634 billion Euro or 768,7 billion US Dollar), of which 54,1 trillion Yen (59,7%) where 
obtained through national tax and 36,5 trillion Yen (40,3%) through local tax. Via instruments 
like the local allocation tax (LAT) and the national treasury disbursement the central 
government allocates resources to the local level. The LAT functions to equalize imbalanced 
financial resources among local authorities. The aim is to guarantee the provision of “standard 
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administrative services and basic social capital to their residents in each region” (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications 2011: 12). In contrast to the horizontal financial 
adjustment in Germany, the LAT is a vertical means of equalization (Hüstebeck 2009: 34). 
The LAT draws resources from the corporate tax (34% of the total amount), the income and 
liquor tax (32% of each), consumption tax (29,5%), and the tobacco tax (25,5%). Figure 7 
shows how the regular LAT is calculated for each local government.  
 
Standard financial needs are determined by multiplying unit costs and measured unit numbers 
(e.g. obtained through population census) and applying an adjustment coefficient. Discounted 
standard revenues on the other hand are computed by multiplication of the standard local tax 
revenue and a calculation rate of 75%, plus the local transfer tax and the like. The difference 
results in the amount of the regular allocation tax to cover any shortfalls (ibid.: 11).   
 
 
Figure 7: Calculation of Local Allocation Tax 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2011: 11. 
 
2. Government Structure 26 
Saito and Yamada (2011: 105) note that local authorities determine the use of the LAT means, 
whereas the treasury disbursements are project-linked subsidies and allocated not based on a 
formula, but discretionary. On the expenditure side local government now shows 87,9 trillion 
Yen (59,5%) in contrast to 59,9 trillion Yen (40,5%) on the central government level. 
Consequently the ratio between central and local government has changed from 3:2 in terms 
of revenues to 2:3 in terms of expenditures (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2010: 17). 
Table 8 gives an overview of the settled figures for the period of FY 2004 to FY 2008 of the 
net total accounts (prefectures and municipalities) after duplications have been deducted. 
Local taxes (consisting of prefectural and municipal taxes) amount to more than one third of 
the local revenues.  
Table 8: Local Government Finance (Ordinary account) in trillion Yen  
Item FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 
Revenue 93,442 92,936 91,528 91,181 92,213 
  Local taxes 33,539 34,804 36,506 40,267 39,559 
  LAT grants 17,020 16,959 15,995 15,203 15,406 
  Treasury disbursements 12,350 11,778 10,416 10,222 11,583 
  Local gov. bonds 12,375 10,376 9,622 9,584 9,922 
Expenditure 91,248 90,697 89,211 89,148 89,691 
  General administration 8,941 8,737 8,618 8,906 8,920 
  Public welfare 15,132 15,693 16,259 16,976 17,821 
  Labour 0,359 0,317 0,296 0,276 0,663 
  Sanitation 5,785 5,707 5,510 5,436 5,390 
  Civil engineering work 15,235 14,417 13,853 13,391 12,871 
  Education 16,910 16,578 16,472 16,432 16,147 
Source: adapted from Statistics Bureau 2012c  
 
The LAT grants show values of at least 15,203 trillion Yen (about 96,53 billion Euro 
or 129,13 billion US Dollar), equalling roughly one fifth of the total incomes. The treasury 
disbursements range between 10,222 and 12,350 trillion Yen (values ranging from 64,90 
billion to 96,37 billion Euro, or 86,83 billion to 119,10 billion US Dollar), or 11% and 13% of 
the revenues. Again, table 8 shows values of revenues exceeding those of expenditures in all 
years included. The question is if this set of data is complete in that it gives all information 
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about the status of the local government finance. The isolated view given in table 8 indicates 
that reforms need to be addressed especially on the central level. Another set of data provided 
by the Statistics Bureau of the MIC presents “net excess of revenue” with positive values for 
the vast majority of bodies (prefectures and municipalities), opposed to relatively few 
showing negative values for the period of FY 1990 to FY 2008 (Statistics Bureau 2012e).  
 
The fact that local governments in Japan show high expenditure rates would allow for the 
assumption that a decentralized system is employed, but as the central government has 
retained a significant proportion of decision-making power this conclusion is wrong 
(Mochida 2001: 2). Mochida identifies the higher local expenses as a strong point of the 
Japanese system. Need for improvement is seen in the redefinition of responsibilities “for 
designing, implementing and financing these assignments”, as the central government is still 
too much involved in local affairs (ibid.: 7). Akizuki (2001: 2) introduces the concept of 
“controlled decentralization” that combines the notion of control and “the inevitability of 
decentralization”. According to this model there are two coexisting paths of control and 
centralization on the one hand, and autonomy and decentralization on the other hand. The 
LAT is found in both groups, as it is handled by the central government, but made available 
for local governments, whereas the legal instrument of agency-delegated functions, for 
example, is only referred to the centralization category.   
 
Japan has implemented two contradicting approaches and it seems that there are still high 
friction losses because the central government tries to retain power over local entities. In order 
to improve processes and public sector outcomes several decentralization efforts have been 
made. An overview of the post-war period and a more precise description of the most recent 
decentralization reform measures are given in chapter 4 below.  
 
Excursus: Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) is another specific feature of the Japanese 
public sector. The government established it in 1953 to have financial resources for market 
interventions aimed at funding infrastructure projects or at promoting economic development 
(Tsuji 1996: 2). Doi and Ihori (2009: 274) describe it as a means to provide “long-term 
funding” which private investors would not be able to handle. The system of the FILP was 
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financed by the use of “postal savings”, reserves from “employee and national pension” and 
various others, as well as “deposits of government institutions” (ibid.: 11). In FY 2001 the 
potential sources were limited as the availability as a matter of course of “postal savings and 
pension reserves” was eliminated as illustrated in figure 8 below (ibid.). Thus, the financial 
markets are now the major source of funds for the FILP.   
 
A detailed description of the FILP cannot be carried out in this thesis, for further information 
see, for example, the FILP Report 2011 of the Ministry of Finance, Doi and Ihori 2009, 
Tsuji 1996, and Conrad 2000. However, there are some interesting characteristics that should 
be kept in mind. Although the FILP is officially not part of the budget, it is passed by the Diet 
due to its enormous dimensions of two thirds of the national budget (Conrad 2000: 209), 
which is also the reason why it is known as a “shadow budget” (ibid.: 211) or the “second 
budget” (Colignon and Usui 2003: 84). The FILP Plan is formulated and includes the funds 
planned for each year. 
So-called “FILP agencies”, including the local government, receive funds through various 
channels (FILP bonds, government-guaranteed bonds, etc.), which they use for loans and the 
like, and the provision of public goods and services (see figure 8). The total outstanding sum 
of “loans and investments” equalled 83% of the Japanese GDP and amounted to 418 trillion 
Yen (about 3,79 trillion Euro or 3,31 trillion US Dollar12) at the end of FY 2000 (Doi and 
Ihori 2009: 274). Due to the enormous volume of funds involved in the FILP the government 
has made several efforts to slim down the FILP plans. It achieved a significant decrease from 
its peak in FY 1998 of about 37,1 trillion Yen (about 277,6 billion US Dollar13) to 14,9 
trillion Yen (about 124,5 billion Euro or 177,3 billion US Dollar) in FY 2011 (Ministry of 
Finance 2011b: 8).  
                                                
12 Converted with exchange rates of March 2001 ultimo values.  
13 The Euro/Yen exchange rate is only available starting from December 31, 1998. Thus, only the US Dollar 
equivalent is shown for this figure. 
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Figure 8: Mechanism of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
Source: Ministry of Finance 2011b 
 
The outstanding amount could also be decreased to 189,2 trillion Yen (105 billion Euro or 
149 billion US Dollar) at the end of FY 2010 (ibid.: 31). Still, the FILP, and thus the 
importance of public financial actions should be reduced given the developmental stage of the 
Japanese economy (Doi and Ihori 2009: 279). 
2.7. Public Debt 
Since the burst of the ‚bubble economy’ in the early 1990s and the subsequent ‚lost decade’ 
the budget deficits have seen a rapid growth.  
 
Figure 9: General Government Gross Debt (% of GDP) 
Source: OECD 2011 
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Although the Japanese government has taken several steps to balance the tight situation it is 
still far from achieving sustainability in its budgets as the following arguments and data will 
show. Figure 9 manifests that Japan by far has the highest rate of indebtedness with 
about 200% of its GDP in 2010 in comparison with other OECD countries. The debt ratio 
continuously increased from 135,4% in 2000 to 167,0% in 2007. The OECD average started 
at 59,4% in 2000, decreased to 55,6% in 2007 and went up to 74,2% in 2010. But still, 
Japan’s figure is almost three times as high as the OECD average. Consequently Japan has to 
make every effort to address this particular issues. According to the OECD (2011: 88) the 
austerity measures would have to amount to 31% of the potential GDP in order to downsize 
debt to 60% by 2026.  
 
In its most recent attempt to improve its tight financial situation the government took another 
step towards the gradual increase of the consumption tax. The corresponding legislation was 
passed in August 2012 and enables the government to implement the “comprehensive social 
security and tax system reforms” (Daily Yomiuri Online, August 11, 2012). The consumption 
tax is designed to increase from currently 5% to “8% in April 2014 and 10% in 
October 2015” (ibid.).  
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3. Towards a Small Government 
Although the Japanese government is relatively small in the international comparison, several 
attempts have been made to further reduce its size. As illustrated in figure 6 in chapter 2.5. 
reforms can be introduced on the central, prefectural and municipal level. Furthermore, the 
relations between the different levels can be subject to fundamental changes as outlined in 
chapter 4. This chapter, however, focuses on the central government level. The Japanese 
government has implemented several measures to streamline its administration and thereby 
cut costs and improve services at the same time. Some of the initiatives have their origin in 
international trends, like the New Public Management (NPM) further described below, others 
were only instigated in Japan, like the e-Japan and u-Japan policies14. Over the past decades 
the government has planned and carried out numerous reforms (pension, health, education, 
regulation, and many more). The focus in this chapter lies on recent administrative and 
decentralization reform efforts, and the role of NPM in Japan. 
3.1. Post-War Public Sector Reforms 
According to Yamamoto (2003: 11) the public sector in Japan has seen three major reforms 
on the central government level since the end of World War II. The timeline is assumed to 
end with the turn of the millennium. The first was realized in the early 1960s under the 
supervision of the First Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform (FPCAR or 
Rinchō I). About twenty years later, the second reform efforts were started in the early 1980s 
and resulted in the formation of numerous commissions and other advisory bodies. The 
Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform (SPCAR or Rinchō II), for 
example, was established to achieve „the goal of ’medium-sized government’“ (ibid.) and 
initiated the privatizations of large state-owned enterprises. The Administrative Reform 
Commission (ARC), also representative for this period, was established in 1983, with the aim 
to continue the reform path chosen (Muramatsu and Matsunami 2003: 173). Further details on 
the efforts in the 1980s are given in chapter 3.4.1. The third major reform endeavour alluded 
by Yamamoto was launched by PM Hashimoto (in office 1996-1998, see table 1 in 
chapter 2.2.3.) and was finally implemented in January 2001. The last-mentioned measures, 
                                                
14 The Republic of Korea has developed a similar strategy known as the „u-Korea Master Plan“. For further 
details see for example Oh and Larson 2011: 113ff. 
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summarized as the Hashimoto reforms, comprised a bundle of six packages. During a speech 
at the Asia Foundation and Public Policy Institute of California in San Francisco in May 1997 
Shionoya Yuichi, member of the ARC, enumerated these areas particularly relevant for 
reform activities as stated by the then PM Hashimoto. The list covered budget, economic, 
financial, welfare, educational, and last but not least administrative reform. The latter was 
seen to have a crucial role in the whole set as a structural umbrella enhancing the outcome of 
the five other reforms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012a), and will thus be 
described in more detail.   
3.2. Administrative Reform 
The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines the verb reform as to “make changes in 
(something, typically a social, political, or economic institution or practice) in order to 
improve it (…)” (Pearsall 1998: 1560). The Brockhaus encyclopaedia refers to the Latin verb 
reformare (to reshape or redesign), describing a reform as the systematic rearrangement, 
improvement, reorganization of the existent (p. 657f.).  
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000: 8) approximate public management reform as structural and 
process changes with the aim of enhancing the functionality of public sector institutions.  
Caiden (2009: 1) sees administrative reform as “the artificial inducement of administrative 
transformation against resistance”. It goes hand in hand with the ability to organize social 
activities. In another publication he compares administrative reform to “a continuous program 
of administrative improvement” (Caiden 1999: 816). Peters presents a table with different 
types of administrative reforms subdivided into three groups. He distinguishes between 
market, participation and deregulation reform. The first category covers, amongst others, the 
“agency model”, the principle of “pay-for-performance”, the “internal market” approach, and 
program reviews. (Peters 1997: 74). The common feature is the introduction of competition 
for cost reduction and performance improvement (ibid.: 73). The second group includes the 
principles of “quality management”, “decentralization”, and the idea of “citizens’ charters” 
(ibid.: 74). Performance gains are obtained through the involvement of employees and 
costumers (or clients) and thereby taking advantage of their knowledge and understanding in 
the decision making process (ibid.: 73ff.). The last of the three rubrics contains “purchasing” 
and “personnel deregulation”, as well as the concept of “bulk budgeting” (ibid.: 74). 
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Peters (1997: 75) finds the “source of change” in the emphasis on rules, as opposed to 
competition in the first category. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2003: 23) propose the classification of 
reforms along “four main strategies”: maintain, modernize, marketize, and minimize. The first 
strategy tries to preserve the “administrative machine” but economize and optimize as far as 
possible (ibid.). The basic idea of the second approach is to bring about substantial changes in 
both processes and structures. Pollitt and Bouckaert illustrate this with the help of some 
examples like the change in budget processes from input to output orientation, independent 
agencies as a new public organization type, and the like. The third proposal is characterized 
by the introduction of “Market-Type Mechanisms (MTMs)”15 to realize efficiency and 
performance gains (ibid.). The fourth principle aims to downsize the public sector to the 
greatest possible extent. Privatization and contracting are mentioned as the preferred means to 
achieve this aim. Tanaka (2010: 3) states that both “reform” and “administration” cover 
various meanings, it is thus not surprising that a multitude of definitions for administrative 
reform can be found.  
3.3. New Public Management 
New Public Management (NPM) is known as a paradigm that emerged in the 1980s in Anglo-
Saxon countries, with New Zealand taking a leading role. According to Peters (1997: 71) the 
NPM has become a global “gold standard for administrative reform”, differing in scope and 
time of implementation. He also finds a common denominator, namely the belief that 
governments would function better if private sector management methods were applied. 
Yamamoto (2003: 4) indicates that there is no consensus on the precise definition of NPM, 
but rather a general agreement on the basic principles. Koike (2000: 2) even compares it with 
“a salad bowl of different ideas for government reform”. Wollmann (2003: 2) shortly 
describes it as based on a cycle of setting goals, implementing and evaluating them. 
According to Hood (1991: 3) the spread of NPM ideas can be linked to “four other 
administrative ‘megatrends’”: the endeavour to decelerate the growth of or downsize 
governments, the transition away from government institutions to (quasi-) privatization, the 
development of automated public services, and the development away from national 
specialism towards a more international, general agenda.  Hood (ibid.: 4f.) also identified and 
                                                
15 Market-type mechanisms are defined as encompassing „all arrangements where at least one significant 
characteristic of markets is present“, most prominent examples are outsourcing, public-private partnerships 
(PPP), and vouchers (Blöndal 2005: 81), as well as user charges and transferable permits (ibid.: 104).  
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described seven overlapping basic principles summarized by Yamamoto (2003: 4) as follows: 
“ 
(1)  an emphasis on hands-on professional management skills for active, visible, 
discretionary control of organizations (freedom to manage); 
(2)  explicit standard and measure of performance through clarification of goals, targets, 
and indicators of success; 
(3) a shift from the use of input controls and bureaucratic procedure to rules relying on 
output controls measured by quantitative performance indicators; 
(4) a shift from unified management systems to disaggregation or decentralization of 
units in the public sector; 
(5) an introduction of greater competition in the public sector so as to lower costs and 
achievement of higher standards through term contracts, etc.; 
(6) a stress on private-sector-style management practices, such as the use of short-term 
labor contracts, the development of corporate plans, performance agreements, and 
mission statements; 
(7) a stress on cost-cutting, efficiency, parsimony in resource use, and ‘doing more 
with less.’” 
 
The origins of NPM are described “as a marriage” between the opposites of the “new 
institutional economics” and the “business type ‘managerialism’ in the public sector” 
(Hood 1991: 5). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2003: 28) summarize that “NPM has been all about 
improving performance”, keywords in this regard are cost awareness, efficiency, 
effectiveness, customer-orientation, flexibility, transparency, and so on. They criticize that the 
theoretically achievable performance gains have often been inadequately evaluated. The 
principles of the NPM are not unquestioned at all, as several publications indicate (see for 
example Mathiasen 1999, Atreya and Armstrong 2002, Dunn and Miller 2007, or 
Mongkol 2011). It seems as if the NPM movement has passed its peak, at least in some 
countries (Dunleavy et al. 2006). 
3.3.1. NPM in Japan 
According to Hori (2003: 3) it appears that the Japanese bureaucracy rather than politicians 
(like in the US, United Kingdom or New Zealand) undertakes the NPM-inspired reforms. In 
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the same paragraph he points out that bureaucrats significantly hamper the “full development” 
of the Japanese Public Administration caused by the limited ability to learn “from NPM 
reforms” and the “misuse of NPM” (ibid.). It is commonly agreed on that NPM was adopted 
rather late in Japan compared on the international level. Muramatsu and Matsunami 
(2003: 180) conclude that the economic heydays, particularly in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, better known as the “’bubble economy’”, led to the misbelief that there was no 
need for reform of the public sector. Increasing government revenues in that time 
strengthened the misguided conviction as pointed out by Otake (1999: 381-387 cited in 
Muramatsu and Matsunami 2003: 180). But as Muramatsu and Matsunami (2003: 180) reveal 
an increasing number of issues waited to be resolved. Thus the need for reforms finally re-
emerged after the burst of the bubble and the corresponding economic and political after-
effects. In the wake of scandals caused by high-level bureaucrats and the rising awareness of 
necessary changes the way for reforms of the central government and the civil service was 
paved.  
 
Yamamoto (2003: 13) points out that only two of the above-mentioned NPM principles were 
identified for the implementation in the central government reform program compiled by the 
Council for Public Sector Reform (also known as the Administrative Reform Council, created 
in 1996 with the purpose to discuss the restructuring of the central government). In this 
context the Final Report of the Council recommended on the one hand to strengthen policy 
evaluation (both ex ante and ex post) in the central government (ibid.: 14). On the other 
“agentification as disaggregation/decentralization” was the second field for NPM style 
measures (ibid.: 17). In contrast, Muramatsu and Matsunami (2003: 175) argue that “many 
NPM tools” were implemented under the overall heading of “reorganization”. They add at 
least outsourcing to the already mentioned terms above. However, the following sections 
cover the implementation of the principles “agentification” and “policy evaluation” in Japan.  
3.3.2. Agentification – Independent Administrative Institution (IAI) 
The catchword “agentification as disaggregation/decentralization” has already been part of the 
“Hashimoto Vision” in 1996, named after PM Hashimoto (Yamamoto 2003: 17) and is 
particularly interesting because it serves as an example of how Japan adopted new concepts 
from overseas (Muramatsu and Matsushita 2003: 175). The basic idea is to separate policy-
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making and implementation functions, with the former resting in central government organs 
and the latter being assigned to (semi-)autonomous institutions/agencies. Pollitt et al. 
(2001: 275) define agencies as “one species in the genus public service providers”, 
representing a form of organization that is “closest to the traditional core bureaucracy”. 
Functions are moved out of the central government sphere but rest within a short distance. 
This is one reason why the concept of agencies seems as if it was made for Japan – there is 
certain change in structures visible for citizens, but control can still be exercised to a 
comfortable extend. It is further pointed out that agencies are able to help governments fulfil 
the call to “’do more with less’” (ibid.: 277). In theory, public sector features like the quality 
and efficiency of services will improve with increased levels of autonomy, specialization, 
separation, transparency, and the like (ibid.). The ideal agency in terms of NPM 
characteristics shows the following features: professional management, flexibility, and 
responsiveness to customers, specialization, efficiency, and intense performance orientation. 
Activities are carried out in a most transparent way, supported by state of the art IT and 
accounting standards. In addition, “structural disaggregation” and “performance contracting” 
are identified as the “two key dimensions”, with the first being the prerequisite for flexible, 
specialized and customer oriented behaviour, and the latter ensuring the focus on objectives 
that are politically authorized (ibid.: 279). 
 
As was indicated above, scandals within the bureaucracy drew the public attention to the 
reform issues in the run-up to the general elections in 1996 (Yamamoto 2003: 17). PM 
Hashimoto won the elections and carried out four important reforms: power gain for the 
cabinet, central government reorganization, outsourcing, and civil service system reshaping 
(Muramatsu and Matsushita 2003: 175). The reduction of number of ministries as an 
important part of the reorganization efforts is described further below in chapter 3.4.2. Both 
Yamamoto (2003: 17f.) and Muramatsu and Matsushita (2003: 175f.) indicate that the 
Japanese concept of Independent Administrative Institutions (IAI) was essentially based on 
agentification in the UK. Both also find substantial differences, beginning with the definition 
of agentification (PM Thatcher specified it as “’management reform in the civil service’”, 
whereas PM Hashimoto saw it as tightening up the government) (Yamamoto 2003: 17). After 
detailed discussion on the legal nature the Japanese government established the legally 
autonomous IAIs and transferred the function of policy implementation in selected domains 
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(in contrast to the “UK’s Executive Agencies”) (ibid.: 18). Areas where implementing 
policies included the “exercise of coercive authority over citizens” were completely ruled out 
from the outset, e.g. social security or granting of patents (these areas were strong candidates 
for UK agencies). Instead, the fields of  “financing, operations, construction and management 
of assets” (Yamamoto 2006: 36), culture, research and education (Pollitt et al. 2001: 283) 
were envisaged. It is assumed that the nature of these particular sectors will cause problems 
with regard to measurement of outputs and performance (ibid.). 
 
Goldfinch (2006: 585) stresses that – contrary to original commitments considering the 
independence – most of the IAI employees (their number and salaries) were determined 
according to the National Public Service Law, the scope of discretion related to expenses was 
limited, and the heads of the new institutions were appointed from among “former ministry 
officials”. Yamamoto (2003: 19f.) presents similar findings revealing considerable differences 
in the design and implementation stage. In 2001, when agentification was started with 57 
entities, 50 “Chief Executives were the products of amakudari instead of being chosen from 
an open recruitment process (ibid.: 20). The IAI concept was implemented in 
approximately 2,2% of the public sector (Goldfinch 2006: 585). IAIs receive government 
funding through operating grants on the one hand, and subsidies on the other hand 
(Yamamoto 2006: 38). According to the MIC there are 102 IAIs as of April 1, 2012 (Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications 2012b).  
The “Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy” demanded a “zero-based review” of the 
government functions and as an aspect of this review gave recommendations on how to carry 
out a reform of the IAIs (Ito et al. 2007: 1). Growing criticism related to amakudari and the 
questionable usefulness of IAIs has resulted in the need for reform. It was recommended to 
apply the principles of “’Public to Private’”, competition and consistency (ibid.: 3f.).  
3.3.3. Policy Evaluation 
The policy evaluation is part of the process of policy making, which can roughly be divided 
into four general stages (Bryner 2003: 301f.), with a changing number of steps in between, 
depending on the approach. Although a cycle typically has neither beginning nor ending the 
list of stages usually starts with the identification and definition of problems, and is followed 
by the formulation of a program that is set on the agenda of the responsible institutions. The 
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third phase – implementation – is described to be more time consuming than the preceding 
ones. Bryner shows a simple underlying connection between the legislative branch 
formulating and the executive divisions subsequently implementing the decisions made 
(ibid.: 302). Ideally, evaluation is carried out throughout the whole process and is not seen as 
the last stage of it. The assessment of policies is essential to the development of policies as it 
uncovers both strong points and potentials for improvement (ibid.). Policy evaluation faces at 
least two challenges: the availability of clear benchmarks and the necessary resources to 
perform a meaningful judgment (ibid.). Sato (2007: 445) explains “administrative evaluation” 
as a sequence of procedures that check if measures and policies are adequate and achieve their 
goals when compared with a certain point of reference. Kudo (2003: 489) distinguishes three 
different kinds of policy evaluation in relation to the implementation stage, namely the ex 
ante, interim, and ex post evaluation. 
 
The idea of policy evaluation was not widespread in the central government in Japan, whereas 
local authorities had begun to develop and implement performance measurement in the 
middle of the 1990s (Yamamoto 2003: 14). The first prefecture set up a “rigorous 
administrative evaluation system” in 1996 (Sato 2007, 446). Six years later all governments 
of prefectures and cities had installed an evaluation procedure. The share of local authorities 
that implemented a comparable system showed a steady increase, too, and reached 67% 
in 2002 (ibid.). The development on the national level was somewhat delayed. Following the 
reports of the “Council for Public Sector Reforms” in 1997, the “Government Policy 
Evaluation Act (GPEA)” was created in 2001 and put into force in 2002 
(Yamamoto 2003: 14). The GPEA was modelled on the US “Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA)” and similarly requires, inter alia, the implementation of performance 
rating by every government body and the publication of reports on the results of performance 
assessment (ibid.). Again, the Japanese version differs from its role model in that it has lower 
requirements concerning output-based budgeting or budget appropriations, which fall under 
the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The Ministry of Public Management, 
Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications (MPHPT) on the other hand is generally 
responsible for the operation of the PE system. The MoF is presumed to be superior compared 
to the MPHPT, thus it is not surprising that findings of PE would not be considered 
effectively in budget appropriations (ibid.: 15). The GPEA leaves the actual implementation 
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of the self-evaluation to each government entity. The “Standard Guidelines for Policy 
Evaluation” give an idea of how to evaluate items, projects or systems but does not provide 
for a uniform standard as the GPRA does, as shown by Yamamoto (2003: 15).  
 
The Japanese interpretation of policy evaluation shows one aspect that the GPRA does not 
cover, namely the third party evaluation, which is required in two levels and carried out in the 
first instance by the MPHPT and the “Commission on Policy Evaluation and Evaluation of 
Independent Administrative Institutions”, functioning as the evaluation watchdog (ibid.: 16). 
In sum, the policy evaluation in Japan is a trimmed down version compared to the US model, 
and the question is if the benefits from its implementation outweigh the energy necessary to 
fulfil the additional requirements or if it is once more a path that leads to much ado about 
nothing.  
3.4. Administrative Reforms in Japan 
In the following the focus lies on the concept of administrative reforms and how it is 
experienced and recently implemented in Japan. As Nakamura (1996: 4) points out 
administrative reform in Japan usually refers to the specific attempts initiated by the 
government in 1981 (see also Sato 2007: 446) and does not cover decentralization and 
deregulation, in contrast to many other countries including the United States and Great 
Britain. These two instruments have been considered separately because of their perceived 
importance. Privatizations, on the other hand, were carried out in the course of the 
administrative reform initiatives as further described in the next section. 
Furukawa (2003: 24ff.) on the other side indicates that intergovernmental relations and 
decentralization were included in administrative reform efforts. However, the decentralization 
efforts are outlined separately in chapter 4. In an earlier publication he points out that the 
concepts of administrative reform and “’administrative reorganization’” are occasionally 
equated and summarizes four central fields covered by these expressions 
(Furukawa 1999: 440): “reform of administrative management where policy is made”, 
“reform of basic national policies”, “deregulation” in order to obtain a restructured economy 
better adopted to globalization, and the attempts to “synchronize Japanese systems with 
global standards”. Furthermore, he enumerates four stages of administrative reform since the 
end of World War II shown in table 9 below.  
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Table 9: Administrative Reform Phases (since 1945) 
Administrative Reform Phase Period 
Democratic Phase 1945-1950s 
Management-Oriented Phase 1960s-1970s 
Liberalistic Conservative Phase 1980s 
Reorganization Phase 1990s 
Source: Furukawa 1999: 440f. 
 
Table 10 shows an overview of selected committees and councils convened to facilitate 
administrative reform since 1961. 
Table 10: Administrative Reform Bodies (since 1961) 
Selected Administrative Reform Institutions Period 
First Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Rinchō I) 1961-64 
Rinchō II 1981-83 
Provisional Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform I 1983-86 
Provisional Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform II 1987-90 
Provisional Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform III 1990-93 
Administrative Reform Committee 1994-97 
Headquarters for Promotion of Central Government Reform 1998-2001 
Headquarters of Administrative Reform Since 2001 
Sources: Cabinet Secretariat 2000, Cabinet Secretariat 2012b, Cheung 2005: 258f., Masujima 2005: 297. 
 
Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been at least one committee, council or 
headquarters entrusted with the task to plan and revise potential reform efforts and provide the 
PM in charge with advisory support. 
3.4.1. Administrative reform efforts since the 1980s 
Within the framework of administrative reforms presented in the following, two major 
strategies can be observed. On the one hand, a structural change is intended to improve 
government functions and cost-issues. This change necessitates, on the other hand, a fiscal 
reform, as the internal arrangement of central and local governments is altered. According to 
Furukawa (1999: 442) the 1980s can be seen as the “Liberalistic Conservative Phase” of 
administrative reform. The starting point for the these efforts however can be found much 
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earlier, in 1961, when the First Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (also 
known as Rinji Gyōsei Chōsakai, abbreviated Rinchō I) was created. It represents the basis for 
“administrative reform in Japan thereafter” (Masujima 2005: 295). The Rinchō I 
recommended to establish the Cabinet Office, to take measures that ensure the budget is 
drafted by the Cabinet, to separate the planning from the implementation function, to re-
allocate administrative functions “rationally between central and local government”, and to 
prevent “career civil servants” from attending Diet committees as “government delegates” 
(ibid. 296). In the 1960s these proposals were regarded as “largely unfeasible”, a claim that 
was refuted by the later implementation of the recommendations as part of the Hashimoto 
reforms. The Rinchō II started its actions in March 1981 and operated until March 1983 
(Masujima 1999: 216). Against the background of increasing deficits the overall aim was to 
regain fiscal balance but to avoid any tax increases at the same time (Furukawa 1999: 442). In 
the same year the Rinchō II was dissolved, the Provisional Council for the Promotion of 
Administrative Reform (PCPAR) was created to put into practice the results of its predecessor 
institution, and was convened two more times in 1987 and 1990 (ibid.). As indicated by 
Wright and Sakurai (1987: 123) it did not only promote and put into practice the Rinchō 
proposals, but submitted new propositions in addition. The period starting with the 
establishment of Rinchō II in 1981 until the end of PCPAR actions in 1993 is called “’the 
Rinchō reform period’” (ibid.: 217). The outcomes and their evaluation six years after the end 
of the reform period are summarized in table 11 below. According to the findings of 
Masujima in 1999 successful implementation of the reform efforts was achieved in the fields 
of “Privatization”, “Fiscal Review and Cutback of Substantive Programs”, “Revision of the 
National Government Organization”, “Curtailment and redistribution of staff”, and 
“Transparency and fairness measures” (ibid.: 218). The areas of reorganization, deregulation 
and decentralization showed unsatisfactory results (ibid.).  
Despite the successful privatizations the 1980s-efforts have left some tasks unaccomplished. 
The “imperfect devolution” and minimal deregulation (only about 0,5% of more than 10.000 
regulations were affected) induced demand for decentralization and deregulation in the 
early 1990s (Furukawa 1999: 442). Deregulation during the tenure of PM Takeshita was 
meant to help induce structural changes of the Japanese economy as an element of 
administrative reforms (Masujima 2005: 297).  
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Table 11: Basic Achievements and Evaluation of Rinchō Reforms 
Basic Achievements Evaluation 
Privatization of   
   Japan National Railways successful 
   Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corp. successful 
   Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corp. successful 
Public Corporations  
   Abolition and rationalization (fairly) good 
Fiscal Review and Cutback of Substantive Programs  
   (Social Security, Public Works, Agriculture, Education, etc.) successful 
Revision of the National Government Organization  
   Law in order to make organizational control more flexible successful 
Reorganization  
   Strengthening the cabinet (cabinet leadership) unsatisfactory 
   Reorganization at the ministerial level unsatisfactory 
   Reorganization at the bureau level successful  
Liquidation of local branch offices (fairly) good 
Curtailment and redistribution of staff successful 
Deregulation  
   Mechanisms for promoting deregulation unsatisfactory 
   Achievement of deregulation unsatisfactory 
Transparency and fairness measures  
   Enactment of personal data protection bill successful 
   Enactment of administrative procedures bill successful 
Decentralization unsatisfactory 
Source: adapted from Masujima 1999: 218. 
 
The 1990s are described as the “Reorganization Phase” in terms of administrative reform 
(Furukawa 1999: 442). Following the recommendation of the third PCPAR the 
“Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters” was established, located directly within the 
Cabinet (United Nations 1997: 46). In 1994, during the tenure of PM Hosokawa, the 
government established the five-member “Administrative Reform Committee” with the 
primary function to monitor the reform progress, including deregulation 
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(Furukawa 1999: 442). Deregulation moved to the central focus of the Administrative Reform 
Committee, which operated until 1997 (Masujima 2005: 297). Meanwhile, the still powerful 
bureaucracy was weakened by a series of scandals and policy failures, resulting in declining 
trust in the bureaucratic competence. The “Administrative Reform Council” (ARC) was 
established in 1996 by PM Hashimoto with the task to formulate a plan for central 
government reorganization in order to get it ready for future requirements. PM Hashimoto 
ordered the ARC to draft precise suggestions concerning central government and PM 
functions, and central bureaucracy realignments (Furukawa 1999: 443).  
 
The “Agency of Management and Coordination” (AMC) was established in order to monitor 
the advancement of administrative reform (North 2003: 114). The ARC counted 15 members, 
including the chairman/PM Hashimoto, the Minister for Administrative Reform and Director 
of the AMC Muto, several university professors, as well as labour and business advisors. 
Meetings were set to take place twice a month and substantial results were scheduled for one 
year after the commencement of work (ibid.: 115). The cabinet decided in December 1996 to 
adopt the Administrative Reform Programme between FY 1997 and FY 2000 (United 
Nations 1997: 36). The program covered a whole range of measures as enlisted in the United 
Nations Country Profile of Japan (ibid.: 38):” 
1. reforming central ministries and agencies; 
2. rationalizing administrative organizations; 
3. reducing and rationalizing public corporations and the like; 
4. inspecting administrative units; 
5. managing personnel; 
6. rationalizing subsidies; 
7. promoting deregulation; 
8. promoting decentralization; 
9. reviewing the division of responsibility for the public and private sectors; 
10. promoting disclosure of government information; 
11. recovering trust in the administration and in civil service; 
12. reducing the burden on people related to applications and other procedures; 
13. promoting the use of advanced information technologies in public administration.” 
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The list shows items that sound quite familiar to the attentive reader. Especially deregulation 
and decentralization are topics that appear repeatedly. Masujima (2005: 301) describes 
deregulation as “a central plank of administrative reform since 1987”, and further explains 
that it was often not related to the improvement of public administration efficiency and a 
reduction in administrative expenses.  
The above-mentioned intentions cover a wide range and are kept rather general in this 
programme. A more detailed implementation was achieved through (partly already existing) 
specific plans such as the “Basic Plan for Computerization of the Government“ (see 
chapter 3.6.) or the „Decentralization Promotion Plan“ (see chapter 4.2.). The specific 
proposal of the ARC to halve the number of ministries served as the basis for the first point in 
the list (Masujima 2005: 298). Although the ARC did not include „fiscal reconstruction, 
deregulation and decentralization“ in its recommendation, PM Hashimoto was convinced that 
decentralization and deregulation formed the foundation for the central government reform 
(ibid.). There are different notions of administrative reform, depending on the economic and 
political circumstances, both in international and national scope, and the government in 
power, a common denominator is the connotation of „positive action of government“ (ibid.). 
The ARC also recommended privatizing the “financial business operations of the postal 
system” in an “interim report” but changed this passage in the final version of the report to its 
complete opposite due to vigorous resistance (Imai 2009: 141). Besides the commitment to 
never implement the privatization of the postal services, the report included three policy 
proposals aiming at the reduction of the governmental involvement (ibid.). The privatization 
was, however, addressed by PM Koizumi as later described in chapter 3.5.2. 
 
Kikuchi (2007: 194) uses another well-known distinction of the reform efforts since 
the 1980s, namely the classification according to the names of PMs in charge and responsible 
for the launch of the different measures as shown in table 12 below. He groups the main 
reform goals into “privatization”, “efficiency (NPM)”, “accountability”, “streamlining”, 
“decentralization, central ministries reform”, and “citizen’s participation” for the reform 
endeavours of the PMs Nakasone in the 1980s, Hashimoto in the 1990s and Koizumi 
from 2001 on (ibid.). PM Nakasone clearly laid his focus on the privatization, whereas PM 
Hashimoto followed a more diversified approach, with the central point of reorganizing the 
central ministries and agencies. PM Koizumi in turn pursued the long-time goal of privatizing 
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the Japanese postal services and tried to tackle several other issues, including the fiscal 
decentralization.   
Table 12: Classification of Reforms by Kikuchi (since the 1980s)  
Main Reform Objectives Main Reform Contents 
 Nakasone Reform 1980s   
    Privatization JNR, NTT, Japan Tobacco 
Hashimoto Reform 1990s  
    Efficiency (NPM) Deregulation, IAIs 
    Accountability Administrative Procedure Law, Public Information 
Disclosure, Policy Evaluation 
    Streamlining Central Ministries, Number of National Civil Service, 
Deregulation 
    Decentralization 
    Ministries Reform  
Decentralization 
Central Ministries Streamlining 
    Citizen’s Participation Public Comments System for regulations change 
Koizumi Reform 2001 ∼  
    Privatization Japan Highway Corporation, Japan Post 
    Efficiency (NPM) Deregulation, Regional Deregulation 
    Streamlining (Net) Streamlining of Number of Civil Service  
(Central and Local) 
    Decentralization 
    Ministries Reform  
Fiscal Decentralization 
Regional Rehabilitation 
    Citizen’s Participation Special Zone for Structural Reform 
Source: adapted from Kikuchi 2007: 194. 
    
3.4.2. Central Government Reorganization in 2001 
The measures reorganizing the central government ministries in 2001 are described as the 
“most extensive structural and institutional reforms for government in the post war era” with 
the focus on rearranging the “central bureaucracy” (Yamaguchi 2001: 71). It serves as an 
example of the “coercive approach” according to Masujima (2005: 298)16. The legal basis for 
the reduction of the central ministries was built with the enacting of the “Law of 
                                                
16  Masujima (2005: 298f.) divides the approaches towards administrative reform into “’coercive’” and 
“’cumulative’” ones. The former category is characterized by a basic structure aimed at the “compulsory and 
collective reform of administrative functions”, while the latter deals with more specific challenges of “individual 
aspects of the organization of government activities (ibid.).  
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Reorganization of Central Ministries and Agencies” in 1998 (Furukawa 2003: 31). The actual 
reorganization was scheduled for January 2001. In many cases the basic system of the 
ministries endured without substantial change, despite their consolidation or renaming (ibid.). 
The central government reform comprised four overarching goals:  
“I  Establishing a System with More Effective Political Leadership 
II  Restructuring of National Administrative Organs 
III More Transparent Administration 
IV Drastic Streamlining of the Central Government”  
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012b). 
 
Integral points of this reform were the strengthening of the PM’s “leadership and a reduction 
in the number of ministries” (Kawabata 2006: 73). The reorganization of 2001 limited the 
maximum number of ministries to a range of 14 to 17, instead of 20 (Gaunder 2011: 10). The 
Cabinet Secretariat was empowered to support the PM in “drafting legislation” (ibid.: 11). 
Within the first point of the above list the establishment of the “Cabinet Office” was one of 
the integral factors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012b). Kawabata (2006: 78f.) 
summarizes the reform outcomes as a fundamental change of the structure of the central 
government, and highlights the reduction of ministries and the expansion of support for the 
prime ministerial leadership. Table 13 shows the ministries and exemplary major agencies 
before and after the central government reform in 2001. The reduction of ministries was 
accompanied by the introduction of IAIs (as described in chapter 3.3.2.) and the promotion of 
policy evaluation (as outlined in chapter 3.3.3.). Under point IV of the list above, the 
government planned to reduce the staff size of civil service on the national level17 and the 
“number of bureaus” by one quarter each, and to decrease the number of divisions by one fifth 
until the end of the 2000s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012b). According to the 
figures presented in table 3 in chapter 2.4.2. the government managed to reduce the number of 
national government employees by more than 25%. A considerable number of public 
employees were transferred to the IAIs.  
 
                                                
17 The total number of national public employees was estimated to 840.000 of which about 300.000 would be 
attributed to the “Postal Public Corporation“ from 2003 on, thus the 25% reduction relates to the 
remaining 540.000 national civil servants (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012b).  
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Table 13: Change in Central Government Ministries and Major Agencies in 2001 
Old system New system 
Cabinet Cabinet 
Cabinet Secretariat Cabinet Secretariat 
Prime Minister’s Office Cabinet Office 
    Management and Coordination Agency     National Public Safety Commission 
    Defence Agency     Defence Agency 
    Economic Planning Agency  
    Environment Agency  
    National Land Agency  
    Science and Technology Agency Etc.  
Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications Ministry of Public Management, Home 
Affairs, Post and Telecommunications 
     Postal Service Agency 
     Fair Trade Commission 
Ministry of Transportation Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport 
Ministry of Construction  
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 
Ministry of Labor Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
Ministry of Health and Welfare Ministry of Environment 
Ministry of Education Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology 
Ministry of Home Affairs  
Source: adapted from Kaneko (cited in Kawabata 2006: 78) 
 
3.5. Privatizations 
The 1970s brought an end to the period of growth in the industrialized countries and the new 
term of state failure. Especially public organizations became a symbol of the state failure and 
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its consequences (Köster 1998: 15). Privatization was the newly introduced concept to reduce 
the public sector radically. The term ‘privatization’ is defined differently, depending on the 
author and the language used (ibid.). Definitions range from the change of ownership from 
public to private to the implementation of private management principles (Lane 2000: 184). 
The idea of privatization appears to be ambiguous as it signifies a retreat of the public sector 
on the one hand, and an advance of market-based principles on the other hand (ibid.: 186). 
Table 14 shows different types of privatization typically found in the German literature as 
listed by Köster.  
Table 14: Types of Privatization 
Type Description 
Material Privatization  
(Privatization of ownership) 
 
State property is sold to private investors 
Functional Privatization 
(Privatization of operations) 
 
Functions previously carried out by public entities 
are outsourced and privatized  
Formal Privatization 
(Privatization of legal identity) 
 
Convergence to competition by implementation of 
private sector forms of organization and action 
 
Execution Privatization Technical implementation of certain operations is 
transferred to private sector with safeguarding 
through contracts and political responsibility 
 
Source: Köster 1998: 15f. 
 
The primary objective of privatization is to improve the efficiency of public sector actions 
(Lane 2000: 185, Köster 1998: 19). A subset of goals exists, for example fiscal consolidation, 
reduced interference from public authorities, weakening of trade unions, redistribution of 
capital, etc. (Köster 1998: 19). Privatization in Japan refers to the change to private 
management (??? mineika). This term is further specified as either the reorganization of 
public corporation (????? kabushikigaishaka), or the privatization of ownership, a 
synonym for a complete privatization (?????  kanzen mineika) (following 
Matsubara 1991: 47-50 cited in Köster 1998: 16). Japan has seen several privatizations since 
the 1980s, including the Japan Airlines (JAL), the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), 
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the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (JTS), and the Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (for further details see for example Kawabata 2006). This chapter outlines two 
major privatisations. The Japan National Rails (JNR) was initiated in the course of the reform 
endeavours in the early 1980s and serves as an example for those efforts, whereas the 
privatization of the Japan Post was also discussed during the 1980s but was only recently 
initiated and was subject to a heated debate. 
3.5.1. Japan National Rails 
The Japan National Rails (JNR) was seen as one of the “three K’s”18 that were made 
responsible for the public deficit (Ishikawa and Imashiro 1998: 13) in the early 1980s. In 
relation to this issue PM Suzuki offered the slogan “fiscal austerity without tax increase” as a 
solution (Kawabata 2006: 66). One of the means to this end was the privatization of JNR, 
which had piled up deficits of more than 16 trillion Yen (more the 75 billion US Dollar) in 
FY 1981 (ibid.: 198) and provided poor service, thus becoming “an easy target for reformers” 
(ibid.: 67). The initiative was further supported by a report released in April 1982 showing 
how bad the condition of JNR was (Shinoda 2011: 55). But even if all 3 K’s had been 
eliminated, a balanced budget would not have been achievable (Ishikawa and 
Imashiro 1999: 13). Instead of examining the subsidy system the JNR was made the 
scapegoat (ibid.: 14). Köster (1998: 92) indicates that the government did not announce 
clearly formulated goals of the JNR privatization but rather kept a general wording. However, 
Köster lists four major aims, including the increased efficiency (i.e. production at minimized 
costs), reduced public debt through budget consolidation, a broader scope for governmental 
action in terms of financial resources no longer needed for JNR subsidies, and weakened 
influence of labour unions.   
In May 1982 the privatization plans for JNR (and NTT; details on the privatization of NTT 
will be discussed in the subsequent section) were publicised. Due to resistance of the JNR 
management and labour unions difficult negotiations followed. In June 1983 the “JNR 
Reconstruction Administrative Committee”19 started its advisory functions and lobbied in 
favour of the JNR privatization (Kawabata 2006: 69f.). Both the JNR itself and the 
                                                
18 The JNR is referred to as ?? kokutetsu, literally translated as ‘state’ and ‘iron’, meaning state railway. The 
other two K’s are rice (? kome), in terms of rice subsidies, and the national health system (?? kenpo). These 
three items, the „3 K’s“ , were said to have a major share in the rise of the public debt (cf. Ishikawa and 
Imashiro 1999: 19, or Yamamoto 1993: 343).  
19 In Ishiwaka and Imashiro (19998: 13) it is called the „JNR Restructuring Supervisory Committee“.  
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reconstruction committee published plans for the reorganization, with the former rejecting the 
planned break up of the corporation (Ishikawa and Imashiro 1998: 13). PM Nakasone 
replaced the JNR chairman, rearranged great parts of the organization and paved the way for 
the privatization, including the break up, by changing the “balance of power” between the 
Ministry of Transport (MoT) and the JNR (ibid., Köster 1998: 96). In December 1986 the 
relevant bills were passed and the JNR was privatized (Kawabata 2006: 70). Despite doubts 
about the necessity and positive effects (Ishikawa and Imashiro 1998: 14) the JNR was split 
up into several smaller units as listed in table 15. Passenger transport was divided into six 
regionally operating Japan Railway (JR) corporations. In addition, five bus companies were 
established (Köster 1998: 103).  
 
Table 15: Units after break-up of JNR in 1987 
Name Type 
JR Central Corporation 
JR East Corporation 
JR Hokkaidō  Corporation 
JR Kyūshū Corporation 
JR Shikoku Corporation 
JR West Corporation 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation Special Corporation 
JR Freight Corporation 
JR Information Systems Corporation 
JR Telecommunication Corporation 
JR Technical Research Institute Foundation 
JNR Settlement Corporation Special Corporation 
Source: Köstner 1998: 100ff., Ishiwaka and Imashiro 1998: 14ff.,  
 
The JR Freight took over the nationwide freight transport, whereas the Shinkansen Holding 
Corporation owned the Shinkansen20 tracks until 1991 (ibid.: 102). The holding provided the 
tracks in exchange for a fee, paid by the three JRs operating on the “mainland” (i.e. on 
Honshu, the biggest of the main islands: JR East, JR Central and JR West), which was in turn 
                                                
20 Shinkansen (???) is the Japanese version of high-speed trains, comparable to the T.G.V. (train à grande 
vitesse) in France.  
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used to pay off the “long-term debts” originally accumulated by JNR (Watanabe 1994: 96). 
As this system was said to interfere with the progress of privatization (e.g. the fixed costs of 
the newly established JRs were ballooned, depreciation could not be made, their 
independence was restricted; for further details see Ishiwaka and Imashiro 1998: 38; 94) it 
was abandoned and the Shinkansen Holding Corporation was dissolved (ibid.). Another 
important role in the privatization process was assigned to the JNR Settlement Corporation 
(JNRSC) as it assumed most of the JNR debts, redundant staff, and property that was not 
necessary for the railway operations (Köster 1998: 102).  
 
The total debts amounted to over 37 trillion Yen (more than 252 billion US Dollar) in 1987, 
consisting of long-term debts of JNR (roughly two thirds), pensions, the debts of the Japan 
Railways Construction Corporation, and others (Ishikawa and Imashiro 1998: 28, 
Watanabe 1994: 96). As was already mentioned, the JNRSC covered the largest proportion of 
about 25 trillion Yen21 (ibid.). The Shinkansen Holding Corporation initially assumed 5,7 
trillion Yen and took over another 3,5 trillion in 1991 (Watanabe 1994: 97). The JR Freight 
and the mainland JRs shared a total of about 5,9 trillion Yen (ibid.). It was expected that the 
performance of the JRs would vary significantly as the population density and capacity usage 
differed from region to region (and still does). Especially the “island JRs” (meaning the three 
smaller of the four main islands, namely Hokkaidō, Shikoku and Kyūshū) were estimated to 
(continue to) produce deficits (ibid.: 96). Anticipating this trend the Management 
Stabilization Fund was installed to balance the expected losses by “interest income” and 
added another 1,3 trillion Yen to the pile of debts (Fukui 2008: 7). The plans for the 
repayment of debts included sources from operating profits, the shinkansen charges, and 
revenues from sale of land and shares. Still there was a gap of 13,8 trillion Yen to be paid by 
the government, or the taxpayers (Watanabe 1994: 97, Ishikawa and Imashiro 1998: 30). The 
number of JNR staff member peaked at over 600.00022 in 1948 and was reduced to 
roughly 277.000 in 1985 (Watanabe 1994: 92, Köster 1998: 178, Ishikawa and 
Imashiro 1999: 17). The number was continuously reduced by diverse “rationalization 
programmes”, especially shortly before the privatization process was implemented, a sharp 
drop was realized through special agreements and offers for workers who voluntarily retired 
                                                
21 Ishikawa and Imashito (1999: 29) tried to illustrate this enormous amount by equating it with the total sum of 
public debts held by Brazil and Mexico in 1987. 
22 As Watanabe (1994: 92) indicates the JNR had to accept 250.000 „repatriates“ 
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and through job offers from other sectors (industries, local government organizations, and the 
like) (Watanabe 1994: 92; 97). Still, the JR companies could not absorb all of the remaining 
JNR employees in 1987, though the Ministry of Transport used its influence and made them 
accept 20% more than would have been recommended as the optimum number (ibid.: 97). 
With over 200.000 employees transferred to the JR companies, over 45.000 choosing to retire 
(early and regular) and some 20.000 taken care of by the JNRSC less than 2.000 workers had 
to be dismissed (Köster 1998: 178.). Watanabe (1994: 100f.) indicates that several factors 
helped the “smooth implementation” of the JNR privatization: support of the public, revealing 
of numerous fraud cases and accidents, support from within the JNR, and last but not least the 
“strong determination and leadership” of the PMs Suzuki and Nakasone.  
 
In the first year after the split up both freight and passenger companies exceeded the 
expectations and showed a total profit of 151,6 billion Yen or about 1,22 billion US Dollar 
(Ishikawa and Imashiro 1999: 92). The effects of the bubble economy helped to achieve this 
figure without the need to raise fares (Fukui 2008: 7). The “lost decade” following the burst 
of the bubble showed a disparate picture for the mainland companies on the one hand, and the 
island companies on the other hand. While the former could keep their performance on a 
stable level, based on a solid demand, the latter as well as the freight unit were “struggling to 
break even” (ibid.: 8). Although the JR companies were designed to operate independently 
they were still kept together, connected by a system of internal subsidies within the JR group 
(Ishikawa and Imashiro 1998: 93). Even in 2006 the mainland companies provided their 
island sisters with income from interest payments of some 20 billion Yen (roughly 140 
million Euro or 170 US Dollar), thereby preventing losses to be recorded (Fukui 2008: 10).  
 
The JNRSC was dissolved in 1998 and succeeded by the JNR Settlement Headquarters 
(JNRSH) (East Japan Railway Culture Foundation 2007: 26). The JNRSH is mainly entrusted 
with actions related to the payments of pensions and the sale of JR shares and land (ibid.: 27). 
Only the three mainland companies are listed, the sale of their shares started in 1993 (when 
the first tranche of the JR East shares was sold) and was finalized in 2006 (when the third and 
last tranche of the JR Central shares was sold) (ibid.: 29). The freight unit and the three island 
companies, on the other hand, were not yet able to improve their economic situation 
sufficiently for a successful flotation (as a search on the website of the Tokyo Stock 
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Exchange23 indicates). The JNRSH holds a total of 950.000 shares of the aforementioned JR 
companies (as of December 2006) (East Japan Railway Culture Foundation 2007: 29), thus 
the process can only be described as a partial privatization. Köster (1998: 189f.) lists four 
advantages of such partial privatizations: (1) risk minimization concerning the share price, (2) 
profit gain caused by increased share price after performance increase, (3) flexibility thanks to 
sale of smaller tranches, and (4) adaption to the market situation and lower risk of “crowding-
out” effects.  
 
The privatization of the JNR has been a central issue throughout the 1980s and even 30 years 
after the first plans were presented the process is still far from being completed. Obviously, 
the government could not have foreseen the bubble economy and its subsequent burst to 
happen after the initiation of the JNR privatization, but one must doubt that it intended to 
implement it in this way. As Fukui (2008: 11) put it the difficulties of the island and freights 
units have to be resolved and the government has to state clearly whether these companies are 
worth being saved. In this case, they should be subsidized directly through the state and not 
by de facto unrelated companies or taxpayers. The privatizations of the other two major public 
corporations in the 1980s have also only been implemented partially. Imai (2009: 140) 
indicates that the government still is the majority shareholder.  
3.5.2. Japan Post 
The privatization of the Japanese Postal Services System was more than just a privatization. 
Due to its advantages as a government-run business it was subject to discussions between the 
MoF (regulating and supervising its competitors in the private sector) and the Ministry of Post 
and Telecommunications (MPT, running the “postal business”) (Kawabata 2006: 60), thus 
leading to growing demand for privatization. Especially the privatization of the system of 
postal savings was described as “a politically charged issue” since the beginning of the plans 
towards the end of the 1980s (Imai 2009: 137). It was a rather delicate venture given the 
enormous amount of postal savings deposits of 227 trillion Yen, equal to 1,77 trillion Euro 
or 2,18 trillion US Dollar (more than 30% of the “total household deposits”) at the end of 
FY 2003 (Doi and Ihori 2009: 286). Imai (2009: 139) sees the major task of the post offices as 
the collection units of “postal saving deposits”. According to his findings over 90% of all 
                                                
23 The search was conducted on August 9, 2012 at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/.  
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Japanese hold a postal savings account, compared to 35% in France or 26% in Italy (ibid.). 
Another important factor was the large share of 40% of the life insurance market held by the 
Japanese post (Maclachlan 2011: 284). Besides its function as “a local community hub” it was 
essential for the funding of national industry and infrastructure projects as it functioned as one 
of the main sources of the FILP until FY 2001 (see chapter 2.6.) (ibid.). The nationwide 
network of post offices counted more than 24.000 branches with most of them performing the 
primary task to collect postal savings (Imai 2009: 139).  
Koizumi was one of the leading, but not the first (Machlachlan 2011: 286), advocate of the 
postal reform. In his opinion the privatization was “the first and crucial step” towards the 
political and economic reconstruction of Japan (Doi and Ihori 2009: 286). However, he had 
been pursuing this aim for a period of over 20 years (Shinoda 2011: 57). Koizumi campaigned 
for the position of the PM in 2001 with the slogan “’reform without sanctuary’” and was able 
to win the election by major support from the local LDP divisions, instead of relying on the 
backing of the LDP factions, as it had been common practice (ibid.). With his charismatic and 
straightforward attitude he enjoyed high personal popularity.  Privatization plans for the 
postal services had already been formulated under PM Hashimoto (ibid.: 58). In accordance 
with these plans PM Koizumi succeeded, against resistance of unions, bureaucrats, opposition 
and even from within the LDP (Maclachlan 2011: 285), to pass initial legislation in 2002. 
After his re-elections in 2003, he ordered the “Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy” 
(CEFP) to prepare a reform concept, which was presented as the “Basic Principles for 
Privatization” in autumn the same year (ibid.). The reform plan was submitted to the Diet in 
the summer of 2005, but failed to pass the Upper House after successfully passing the Lower 
House (ibid.). PM Koizumi decided to dissolve the Lower House and called new elections in 
September 2005 (Doi and Ihori 2009: 287).  Presiding the LDP, PM Koizumi explicitly 
excluded candidates who opposed the post privatization, known as “’rebels’”, and filled their 
places with “’assassins’”24 (Maclachlan 2011: 286). The elections brought a “landslide 
victory” (Christensen 2011: 60) with a “two-thirds majority” for PM Koizumi (Doi and 
Ihori 2009: 288). The way was paved for the privatization and in October 2005 the relevant 
bills were passed (ibid.). Maclachlan (2011: 284) compares this event with “an attack on the 
                                                
24 Machlachlan (2011: 286) describes those “’assassin’” candidates as being “young” and “often inexperienced”, 
but strongly in favour of the “postal and structural” reforms. A more detailed view on the political events can be 
found there.  
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very soul of Japan” for many citizens, referring to the many tasks performed by the postal 
system.  
 
Figure 10: Structure of Japan Post Group after Privatization 
Source: Japan Post Holdings  Co. 2012 
 
On October 1, 2007 the former Japan Post was liquidated anyway and the new structure as 
illustrated in figure 10 came into effect (Japan Post Holdings Co. 2007: 4). The Japan Post 
Group now consists of the Japan Post Holdings, the Japan Post Service, the Japan Post 
Network, the Japan Post Bank and the Japan Post Insurance. The reform plan stipulated that 
the Japan Post Bank and the Japan Post Insurance should be listed by 2011 and their shares be 
sold in the subsequent period by 2017 (Doi and Ihori 2009: 288; Maclachlan 2011: 288). In 
general, all of the four subsidiary units of the Japan Post Group are describe as oversized, in 
one way or the other. The post service and network divisions need to reduce their numbers of 
staff and post offices, the financial branches and the financial system as a whole are out of 
balance, only a decrease in the former will reduce this mismatch (Doi and Ihori 2009: 288).  
The privatization had been on track, despite the resistance of opposition parties and parts of 
the LDP. But with the government change in 2009 and the DPJ taking power the course of the 
privatization was altered in a fundamental way. In a first step the DPJ passed legislation to 
freeze the sale of the financial postal business divisions (Tudor 2009). This reverse tendency 
was justified with the importance of the network of outlets throughout the country that could 
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be used “to support small businesses, provide nursing care and even as a dating network to 
help increase the birth rate of Japan's aging population” the Postal Services Minister Kamei 
was cited (ibid.). Despite national and international concerns with regards to the distortion of 
competition and negative impacts on the recovery of the Japanese economy (ibid.), the 
reversing efforts were carried on. In April 2012 a “review bill” was passed that amends the 
privatization bill of 2005 to the extent that the obligatory sale of shares was softened to a 
“nonbinding target” and the Japan Post Insurance and Japan Post Bank are allowed “to enter 
new business ventures” without prior approval by the government (The Asahi 
Shimbun 2012). Especially the United States of America (USA) expressed their concern 
about the recent developments, fearing disadvantages for US companies operating in the 
Japanese insurance market (ibid.). The review bill was subject to criticism expressed during 
negotiations of the and with regard to the planned “Trans-Pacific Partnership” as it is 
perceived as a violation of the “free trade agreement” (ibid.). 
 
The amendments of the initial privatizations plans did not only slow down the efforts but even 
reversed it. Thus, the government involvement will not decrease and negative impacts on both 
international relations and economic revitalization might occur. 
 
3.6. Initiatives towards a Small Government and e-Government Trends 
As part of the Rinchō II recommendations and the later Administrative Reform Programme 
the government planned to promote advanced IT in its administration (see chapter 3.4.1.). The 
spread of computer aided service provision and the use of communication technologies was 
identified to contribute to increased efficiency and rationalization in the public sector (United 
Nations 1997: 40). In fact, the five-year „Basic Plan for Computerization of the Government“ 
was already adopted in 1994 (ibid.). Towards the end of the 1990s the government worked on 
the equipment with and improvement of physical information technology infrastructure and 
provided its civil servants with PCs and local area networks, thus improving quality, 
effectiveness and efficiency of the public service (ibid.: 40f.).  
 
In its ongoing effort to improve public services and restore Japan’s supremacy, the 
government has implemented several initiatives. Two of the more recently implemented ones 
are described in the following section, namely the e-Japan and the u-Japan Strategy, designed 
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to optimize the use and thus the benefits of information technology (IT) and information and 
communication technology (ICT).   
3.6.1. The e-Japan Strategy 
This section is mainly based on the information provided by the Cabinet Secretariat (2001a) 
other sources are indicated accordingly. The IT Strategic Headquarters within the Prime 
Minister’s Cabinet presented the e-Japan Strategy in January 2001 at its first session. The 
Strategy was designed as a Priority Policy Program with the overall aim to transform Japan 
into the leading IT nation within the following five years. The underlying idea was to increase 
the connection rate to modern high-speed mobile broadband services all across Japan. The 
ideal IT society was described by four core characteristics: 
- Benefits of IT for all Japanese citizens. 
- Advanced economy and internationally competitive industry. 
- Prosperity and unrestricted interaction for citizens and local communities. 
- Contribution to a global IT/internet society. 
 
The basic guidelines included the division of roles between the public and the private sector, 
the definition of five priority areas, the consideration of cross-cutting issues, and the role of 
the IT Strategic Headquarters. 
As for the first point, the private sector was meant to take the leading part by realising its full 
potential. In addition to the development of a corresponding environment for undisturbed 
market activities the government was demanded to take an active role in areas like e-
government and bridging the digital divide, always keeping the efficient allocation of budget 
in mind. The priority areas comprised the establishment of world leading IT networks in 
Japan, the support of human resources, education and learning, the promotion of e-commerce 
and e-government in the broadest sense, and the definition of safety requirements to ensure 
secure and reliable IT networks. The government committed itself, in addition to the above 
mentioned tasks, to actively handle cross-cutting issues by promoting basic IT research and 
development or by creating an environment in which all people can benefit from internet and 
IT technologies at almost the same level regardless of any constraints whatsoever (age, 
physical condition, or geographical position). The IT Strategic Headquarters was charged with 
the monitoring of the implementation process. It should perform investigations twice and 
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reviews once a year and further develop and implement significant actions (Cabinet 
Secretariat 2001a).  
 
One of the main emphases was placed on the “Digitization of the Administration and 
Utilization of IT in Other Public Areas” (Cabinet Secretariat 2001b). The target definition in 
this priority area included the conversion of public services (e.g. delivery of information, 
application and notification) from paper-based to IT-based. By digitalising the administrative 
procedures the citizens’ and private businesses’ convenience in general was intended to rise.  
 
 
Figure 11: Steps taken in Japan on IT Strategies  
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2007a 
 
The central government planned to support local governments and municipalities during the 
digitization process, as they are more directly interacting with the aforementioned players. In 
parallel to the enhanced public services internal improvements were also considered. Training 
plans to ameliorate the staff’s information literacy and reform of their current mindset were 
envisaged in all offices and ministries (ibid.). As shown in figure 11 the e-Japan Strategy is 
only one step in a series of IT strategies implemented in Japan. The timeline starts with 
at 2001 with the first e-Japan Strategy with its goal to enhance the development of 
infrastructure such as broadband access. In February 2004 the e-Japan Strategy II 
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Acceleration Package was launched, followed by the IT Policy package a year later. The ICT 
policy is followed by the u-Japan policy, which is further described in the subsequent chapter. 
Figure 11 also indicates the establishment of infrastructure and the promotion of use of the e-
Japan Strategies and the u-Japan Policy. The e-Japan Strategy formed the basis for the 
following initiatives by ensuring the spreading of broadband access and by promoting the use 
of e-government and e-commerce. The e-Japan Strategy II pursued aims in seven leading 
areas, including knowledge, employment, SME finance and administrative service. Figure 12 
shows the development from the prerequisite of appropriate infrastructure for the e-Japan 
Strategy, to the e-Japan II Utilization and the emergence of new values under the u-Japan 
Strategy.  
 
 
Figure 12: u-Japan Emergence of New Values 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2007b 
 
Besides the e-Japan Strategy the government was also implementing the Master Plan for 
Promotion of Government-wide Use of Information Technology in 1997, the Millennium 
Project in 1999, and the Basic Law on the Formation of an Advanced Information and 
Telecommunications Network Society, as well as the Administrative Reform Program 2000 
(Nakagawa 2002: 9). However, the e-Japan Strategy represents the most significant step 
towards the implementation of e-government, which is meant to support and necessitate 
administrative reform at the same time (ibid.: 21).  
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3.6.2. The u-Japan Policy 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) had been working on further 
developments of e-Japan Strategies and finally presented the u-Japan Policy in 
December 2004 and a Promotion Package in September 2006 (Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications 2006). The declared objective of the u-Japan Policy was to realise the 
“Ubiquitous Network Society” by 2010. In contrast to the previous strategies the focus was on 
addressing social issues rather than expanding the use of wired ICT. The principal idea was to 
connect people and make services available even beyond existing physical networks. ICT was 
designed to play an ever-increasing role in people’s lives. Aware of the potential risks of and 
defensive attitude towards this planned intrusion into privacy the MIC intended “to upgrade 
enabling environment and to take comprehensive and concrete measures”, giving no further 
detail on how this measures would look like (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications 2007b). The ubiquitous network idea is said to have its roots in Japan 
(Murakami 2005: 1). But other countries, in particular Korea, have also adopted u-strategies. 
 
Despite the ongoing efforts towards better communication and connection between various 
key players data provided by the United Nations (UN) and the OECD indicate that Japan lags 
behind its own expectations. The UN E-Government Survey 2012 shows a ranking of 
the Top 20 countries measured by the “e-government development index” (United 
Nations 2012: 11). According to this list the Republic of Korea is the leading country, 
followed by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Japan only is found on rank 18. The 
OECD data offers a similar conclusion, although a fully valuable comparison is not possible 
as there is no figure given for Japan in 2010. Data provided for 2005 illustrate that Japan 
with 18% is well below the OECD average of 28% of the population interacting with public 
authorities via Internet (OECD 2011: 171). Leading countries like Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden show values of more than 50% in 2005, and an increase to over 60% and 70% 
in 2010.  
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4. Power to the Local Governments 
The national level (see figure 6 in chapter 2.5.) exercises its power over the local governments 
(prefectures and municipalities). If the structure was to change, the relations between the 
central and the local authorities will have to change as well. This chapter examines how the 
transfer of power and responsibilities has been carried out over the last two decades and what 
alternative forms of organization is available for both municipalities and prefectures. Japan 
was, and partly still is, characterized by a relatively high degree of centralization 
(Nakamura 1996: 1) although the opposite view is, as in almost any case, also represented 
(see for example Lijphart 1999: 188ff., who identified Japan as a unitary and decentralized 
democracy). In this thesis, the structure of intergovernmental relations is regarded as 
centralized. No matter from what perspective it is looked at, the public sector in Japan is 
facing several challenges. It is commonly agreed on that the centralized system was working 
well in the decades after the end of World War II until the early 1970s, providing the Japanese 
economy with the necessary framework to recover quickly and grow to be one of the leading 
economies worldwide (e.g. Köllner and Bosse 2001). But the once appropriate system has 
failed to adapt to changing circumstances to an ever growing extend. The „Decentralization 
Promotion Committee“ (DPC), amongst others, has identified the need to redesign the roles of 
governments across the different levels in Japan, shifting power away from the centre in 
Tōkyō towards the subordinated levels (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2008: 12). This chapter deals with the principle of decentralization in general, its 
implementation in Japan, and the development of municipalities in terms of numbers and 
responsibilities.  
4.1. Decentralization  
Aucoin (1990: 122) describes decentralization, along with deregulation and delegation, as 
principles designed to increase the capacity for autonomous actions, make use of clarified 
missions and goal, respond to both „clients/customers“ and members of staff. 
Decentralization, in particular, focuses on the „managers down the line“, who do not longer 
„administer processes and systems“ but „manage operations and people“ (ibid.). Control 
exercised by a central entity is not completely abolished, but limited to fundamental 
strategies. Centralized institutions are characterized by a „paralysis-by-analysis“ or the 
„getting-ready-to-get-ready syndrome“, leading to a „self-inflicted constipation“ (ibid.). In 
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other words, such institutions dedicate more resources and time to preparatory measure than 
to the actual implementation of actions and thus provoke stagnation. Aucoin finds that these 
symptoms match government organizations, which are often driven towards centralization by 
principles manifested in the constitution and political processes. In order to establish 
decentralized structures, managers in subordinated levels have been provided with extended 
„authority and responsibility for policy and expenditure“, as for example in the UK, Canada 
and Australia (ibid.: 123). It is to be noted that the effectiveness of decentralization is only 
achieved if the hierarchical levels within an organization are minimized and trouble-shooting 
by the central division is possible in a quick and effective way, with routine actions managed 
by decentralized units (ibid.). Lane (2000: 253) discusses „decentralization as a strategy for 
enhancing effectiveness and efficiency in the public sector“. He notes that the term is 
ambiguous as more than one process of change may be linked to it. According to his findings, 
the following nine principles correspond to decentralization: 
“ (1) geographical transfer of bureaux from the urban core to the periphery; 
 (2) privatization; 
 (3) emphasis on implementation instead of planning and policy-making; 
 (4) transfer of functions from the state to local governments; 
 (5) transfer of decision opportunities from the central to the local level in the  
       public sector;  
 (6) participation of the local level; 
  (7) access or influence of the local level on the centre; 
 (8) formalization of implicit institutions; 
 (9) integration of organizations.” (Lane 2000: 253f.).  
 
The question of good supply of services remains unanswered due to different individual 
approaches depending on the very service provided. Some of the reasons speaking for and 
against (de-)centralization are summarized in table 16. Centralized structures offer, amongst 
others, the advantages of optimized equality and coordination, whereas they are weakened 
through their hierarchical approach and strong standardization. Decentralized institutions on 
the other side benefit from flexibility, adaptability, and more detailed information about the 
needs of their inhabitants, but involve the risk to pave the way for traditionalism and 
inequalities without a central watchdog (Lane 2000: 254, Doi and Ihori 2009: 202ff.).  
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Table 16: Advantages and Disadvantages of Centralization and Decentralization 
Centralization Decentralization 
+ equality 
+ coordination 
+ uniformity of results 
+ minimized cost for policy formulation 
+ flexibility 
+ adaptability 
+ more/better information about citizens’  
   needs 
- hierarchy 
- excessive standardization 
- welfare loss  
- traditionalism 
- inequalities 
- external effects not considered 
Source: Lane 2000: 254, Doi and Ihori 2009: 202ff.  
 
Usually sub-national authorities or citizens express the need for decentralization, but 
Nakamura (1996: 5f.) found the main arena of the discussion on decentralization in Japan on 
the national level. He identified four major stakeholders, which took key roles in the debate, 
while local authorities stayed in the background. The supporters are „national legislators, 
business leaders, and labour unionists“, opposed by the bureaucracy in the centre, trying to 
prevent any loss of power (ibid.: 6).  
4.2. Decentralization Reform in Japan 
Muramatsu and Matsunami (2003: 176) advise to see the Japanese decentralization reform not 
as guided by NPM principles. They argue that members of the ARC remained largely of the 
conviction that decentralization was to enhance autonomy of local governments rather than to 
realize improvements in terms of effective governmental management. This initial perception 
however shifted, due to the fiscal situation by the time the decentralization efforts „entered the 
stage of legislative drafting“ (ibid.). Thus, the focus moved to a more holistic approach 
towards an effective and productive government in Japan. The appearance of decentralization 
reforms in Japan (as well as in Korea) was observed rather late when compared to other 
similarly developed industrial nations and the level of local autonomy is still lower than in 
countries like the United States (Bae 2007: 90). According to Bae several attempts at 
decentralization were made in Japan since the end of World War II and prior to the most 
recent decentralization reform of the past two decades (ibid.: 91f.). Bae presents five stages in 
the relationship between levels of government in the post-war era elaborated by Koike and 
Wright shown in table 17.  
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Table 17: Phases of Decentralization Reform in Japan 
Phase Description Period Major Reforms and Events 
1 Local Electoral 
Democracy founded 
1945 – 1950 - New Constitution (local autonomy 
and direct election system) 
- Abolition of Ministry of the Interior 
2 Centralization in 
National Development 
1950s – 1960s - Recentralization of administrative 
affairs (police, education) 
- Increase of agency-delegated 
functions 
3 Progressive Movements 1960s – 1970s - National Development Plan (for rural 
regions and more balanced 
development) 
- New Industrial Cities Act (incentives 
for local governments) 
4 Collaborative 
Devolution 
1980s – 1990s - Various decentralization reform 
proposals 
- Privatization, National grant 
reduction, Federation of local 
governments 
5 Promotion of 
Decentralization 
1990s – 2000s - Decentralization Promotion Law 
- Change in limited nature of central-
local relations towards more 
decentralization 
Source: adopted from Bae 2007: 93ff. 
 
Sakakibara (2003: 112) refers to Amakawa (1987: 119) who stated that decentralization is the 
expansion of citizens’ and local authorities’ autonomy. Essentially, “local public entities” 
have the constitutional right to “manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact 
their own regulations within law” (Chapter VIII – Local Self-Government, Article 94).  
 
In Phase 1 of the decentralization movement the “basis of local democracy”25 was founded 
with the enactment of the new constitution and the Local Autonomy Law in the years 
following the end of war, and the abolition of the Ministry of the Interior, which was held 
responsible for the distinctively powerful position of the central government in relation to 
                                                
25 The representatives on the prefectural and municipal levels were no longer appointed by the central 
government but directly elected (see chapter 2.5.).  
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local governments (Bae 2007: 92f.). The local bodies made an important step of development 
away from being mere “branch offices of central ministries” to exercising functions and 
responsibilities on their own (ibid.).  
Phase 2 of the decentralization efforts is characterized by a u-turn back to a “re-centralized” 
administrative system aimed at the support of economic recovery. The central government 
directly controlled local government via “agency-delegated functions” (ADFs), the abolition 
of the system of local elections was considered but finally not put through (ibid.: 94). Kamiko 
(1997: 193f.) describes the status of local units under the “Agency Delegation” concept as 
some kind of vicarious agent, fulfilling the national government’s duties as mandated by law. 
The percentage of agency-delegated tasks ranged from 70% to 80% on the prefectural, and 
from 30% to 40% on the municipal level (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2008: 8). Thus, the local governments found themselves in a similar position as 
before the changes made in the first phase.  
Phase 3 was overshadowed by negative side effects of economic growth and industrialization 
in the 1960s/1970s like pollution of the environment and decreasing quality of life in urban 
areas. As a reaction to these undesirable conditions progressive politicians on the local level 
and officials from parties other than the LDP induced policies with a certain degree of 
innovation and took the opposite standpoint to central authorities. The local development was 
stimulated through measures like the National Development Plan or the New Industrial Cities 
Act, whereas the central government itself expanded quickly in terms of size and power, and 
provoked “coordination problems” (Bae 2007: 95).  
The macroeconomic environment changed from favourable to challenging with the oil shock 
and its aftermath in the 1970s and the international pressure on the Japanese market. 
Regardless of their level, governments faced tight financial situations in Phase 4. Under these 
circumstances Japan was forced to initiate a number of reform programs. Consequently, the 
SPCAR in the early 1980s and the “Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform III” 
(CPAR) in the early 1990s recommended strengthening the autonomy of local governments. 
Measures proposed included to streamline subsidies and abolish the ADFs (ibid.). Jacobs 
(2004: 247) presents an alternative approach to the consolidation of local governments, 
namely the formation of “Federations of Municipalities” (further described below), introduced 
with the revision of the Local Autonomy Law in 1995. Phase 5 features the fade of strong 
bureaucrat resistance in the wake of turbulent economic and political conditions and the 
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“empowering [of] reformists in the governments, localities and businesses” (Bae 2007: 96). 
To promote decentralization several laws were prepared and enacted, following the 
resolutions passed in 1993 (Kamiko 1997: 194).  
 
The “Law for Promotion of Decentralization” of 1995 defined that the decentralization was to 
be advanced by a clear distribution of responsibilities between central and local government, 
an increased level of local independence, and local communities characterized by diversity 
and vigour (ibid.). The law required, in particular, the composition of the “’Decentralization 
Promotion Plan’” (DPP) and the formation of the DPC, with the latter being responsible to 
supply the PM with recommendations to be included in the DPP (ibid.). Following a series of 
“highly respected” suggestions, the DPP was published in May 1998, including six central 
concerns: “ 
(1) Abolition of Agency Delegation, 
(2) Creation of new rules concerning central-local government relations, 
(3) Promotion of the transfer of authorities from central to local governments, 
(4) Re-examination of ‘Compulsory Organizations and Posts’, 
(5) Streamlining of central government disbursements and the amplifying of local 
revenues, and 
(6) Restructuring of local governments’ administrative structures” (ibid.:194f.).  
 
Furukawa (2003: 28ff.) states that four key aspects made the enactment of the law possible. 
One pillar of success was the cooperation of authorities on the prefectural and municipals 
levels and the guaranteed continuation of the two-tiered system. The second factor was the 
involvement of coalition parties in favour of decentralization. The support for the 
decentralization topic by key players in the political arena is identified as another necessary 
feature. Last but not least, a balanced power in the system of administration was essential for 
the Law for Promotion of Decentralization to be passed. Should, theoretically, the LPD have 
been the only governing party back then, it is questionable if the law would have been enacted 
in such a way and at that point of time. 
 
One year after the formulation of the DPP the “Omnibus Decentralization Law” was enacted 
in July 1999, and implemented in April 2000 (Council of Local Authorities for International 
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Relations 2008: 13). The law, referred to as the “high point of decentralization” 
(Furukawa 2003: 21), comprised the abolishment of the strongly criticized ADFs, the 
evaluation of central government control over and interference with local government affairs, 
the clear division of tasks, the transfer of competence to the local level, the examination of 
compulsory regulation of local government organizations (Council of Local Authorities for 
International Relations 2008: 13).  
Altogether, the number of laws concerned exceeded 450. The abolition of the ADF system 
was achieved and brought alone the revision of over 350 laws. The amendments fall into three 
categories: tasks that were abolished, tasks that were directly implemented by the central 
government, or implemented by the local governments as in the past (ibid.). Most of the 
previous ADFs were left for implementation on the local levels, divided into functions of self-
government and those delegated by law (ibid.). Another important change was realized with 
the abolition of the “comprehensive supervisory authority” performed by the central 
authorities (ibid.: 14). In addition, the central government intervention was limited to an 
“absolute necessary minimum” and criteria were determined, as well as a settlement body for 
intergovernmental conflicts was established (ibid.). Certain requirement mechanisms were 
softened, e.g. those concerning the appointment of specific positions or the issuance of local 
government bonds (ibid.). The explanations concerning the clarified roles of central and local 
authorities are kept rather general. Still, positive effects for decentralization are to be expected 
(ibid.: 15). Concerning the transfer of authority a change in the intergovernmental relationship 
is observed from a superior-subordinate style to a more equal and cooperation-oriented one, 
the laws concerning “forestry”, “city planning” and the “child rearing allowance” serving as 
good examples for this development (ibid.). Authority can be transferred from the central to 
the prefectural level, or from the prefectural to the municipal level. 
A first evaluation of the decentralization efforts shows a positive trend and “considerable 
progress” made (ibid.: 17). One of the most important achievements is without doubt the 
elimination of the ADF system. Although the tasks remained within the duties of the local 
units, they now also have the responsibility. Another important step was the “clarification of 
the divisions of roles”, as well as the establishment of rules concerning the intervention of 
central government (ibid.: 17f.). Although “a period of change and review” has been entered, 
there are still several issues to be addressed, e.g. aspects of residents autonomy and the 
financial dimension (ibid.: 19f.). The latter will be dealt with in section 4.5. below. 
4. Power to Local Governments 
 
68 
4.3. Municipal Mergers 
Japan has taken three major steps to decrease the number of municipalities in the last century. 
Starting with 71.314 in 1888 the “Great Meiji Consolidation” brought a significant drop 
to 15.859 entities (Yokomichi 2007: 2). The “Great Showa Consolidation” from the 
mid 1950s to the early 1960s induced a further reduction from 9.868 to 3.472 local authorities 
(ibid.). The “Great Heisei Consolidation” in the period of 1999 to 2006 achieved another 
decline from 3.229 to 1.821 units in 2006 (ibid.). The current number of local authorities 
amounts to 1.724 in 2011 as shown in figure 6 in chapter 2.5. above. The overall trend since 
the Meiji Era is clearly towards urbanization as the number of villages and towns (i.e. the 
smaller units) dropped considerably whereas the number of cities has risen from a few dozens 
at the end of the 19th century (ibid.) to 786 in 2011. Yokomichi (ibid.) outlines the 
background of the Heisei mergers with four fundamental trends: the most obvious 
demographic phenomena of falling birth rates and aging population, the advancement of 
decentralization efforts, the deterioration of central and local government finance, and the 
expanding everyday living space. The demographic trends present challenges for 
municipalities in terms of changing need for services they provide on the one hand and the 
funding possibilities of those services on the other hand. There are three major goals of the 
most recent mergers: to transfer authority to towns and villages, to promote “fiscal 
efficiency”, and to establish systems of local self-government (Namba 2009: 72).  
 
The municipal amalgamations were facilitated by a set of corresponding laws and acts. The 
“Town and Village Act” resulting in the reduction of towns and villages was passed in 1888, 
the “Municipal Amalgamation Promotion Act”, aimed at creating large entities with 8.000 
inhabitants on average, was enacted in 1953, and the “Law for Special Measures on 
Municipal Amalgamation”, also known as the “Municipal Amalgamation Law” was put into 
force in 1965, providing “a variety of exceptional measures to facilitate voluntary 
amalgamation” (Koike 2010: 2). In order to counteract negative reactions the law offered 
financial benefits to municipalities that decided to consolidate or merge, such as a guaranteed 
LAT amount for a 10-year period (ibid.). Due to ‘underperformance’ the Municipal 
Amalgamation Law was extended three times. In addition, the “Decentralization Promotion 
Act” was enacted in 1995 following “the recommendations of the Decentralization Promotion 
Committee” (DPC), which also included to abolish the system of ADFs (ibid.: 3). The 
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amendment of the Municipal Merger Law (as Yokomichi 2007: 10 calls it) in 1995 basically 
changed its neutral nature towards municipal mergers into a promoting tendency. The central 
government offered fiscal advantages for those municipalities deciding in favour of a merger 
(ibid.). The merger of municipalities follows an elaborated procedure, including the 
establishment of a “merger consultation committee” that discusses all relevant features of “the 
newly merged municipality” (location of government bureau, business agreements) and 
develops a “master plan” (Yokomichi 2007: 9). After a successful vote in the affected 
municipal assemblies the application is submitted to the governor, who in turn decides in this 
matter depending on a successful vote in the assembly of the prefecture (ibid.). The merger 
request moves further up to the central government where the MIC “issues a public notice”, 
whereby the merger enters into effect (ibid.). The whole process takes about two years 
(ibid.: 12). The number of mergers amounts to a total of 582 in the period of FY 1999 to 
FY 2005 with a total of 1.993 municipalities merged (ibid.: 18). These efforts brought about a 
further advance of the urbanization trend with the majority 88,5% of the Japanese living in 
cities (ibid.: 13). Another effect was the reduction of assembly members, mayors and 
employees of municipalities (ibid.). The number of mergers is unevenly distributed across 
Japan. The West shows higher rates of decrease (70% and more) than the East (ranging 
from 2% to 5%), thus providing further potential for the implementation of mergers 
(ibid.: 14). A careful examination of the need for the consolidation has to be carried out in 
order to prevent negative impacts from unnecessary mergers. 
4.4. Municipal Federations and “Super-Prefectures” 
Another form of reorganization on the municipal level is the pattern of federations, a concept 
that already discussed at the beginning of the 1960s (Jacobs 2004: 248). Municipalities were 
given the possibility to form so-called „Wide area Federations of Municipalities“ (MFs) 
through a revision of the Local Autonomy Law in June 1995 (ibid.: 247). The central 
government wanted to ensure that the municipalities would be able to handle the tasks that it 
planned to entrust them with (ibid.). MFs are defined, on the basis of Soumusho26 (2002c 
cited in Jacobs 2004: 248), as “groups of adjacent communities, which join together to form 
an extralocal governmental body, for the purpose of administering multiple public services to 
residents in a multi-municipal area”. In contrast to mergers/amalgamations the units engaged 
                                                
26 Soumusho is the Japanese abbreviation for the MIC. 
4. Power to Local Governments 
 
70 
in a MF keep their autonomy, comparable to the divisions in a federal system. Instead of 
merging the government bodies to one, a council representing all communities is in charge 
(ibid.). Jacobs counted 82 MFs covering a total of 759 communities in 31 of the prefectures in 
September 2002 (ibid: 250). The majority (79) were initiated locally (ibid.). The prefecture of 
Nagano, for example, showed a 100% coverage of its 120 municipalities by 10 MFs, whereas 
the lowest value of 3,6% was observed in Niigata with only one MF comprising 4 of the 111 
municipalities (ibid.: 251).  
Jacobs’ findings show that MFs can be considered as an alternative to mergers in several 
regards (ibid.: 269). He states that MFs are comparable with merged municipalities 
concerning the capability of “building local support for national policy”, and sometimes even 
show better values (ibid.). MFs can help pave the way for municipal consolidation and are 
found to be as efficient in implementing “new services” (related to the health care of elderly 
people and insurance) as merged units (ibid.). The greatest potential of MFs is seen in “large, 
sparsely populated regions” as they cost-advantages both in the short and long run (ibid.).  
 
The previous two sections outlined measures to restructure the basis of local government in 
Japan, namely the municipalities. This chapter will deal with the reorganization of the ‘upper 
level’ of the two-tiered local government system. The number of prefectures has been 
unchanged since the establishment of the “Meiji prefectural system” in 1888 
(Muto 2011: 143). But there are certain concepts to reduce it as well and form about 10 units, 
sometimes called “Super-Prefectures” (Doi and Ihori 2009: 230) because of their potential 
size and control, under a regional government system (??? dōshūsei) (Schmidt 2009: 61). 
Further details are given in Doi and Ihori, Schmidt 2009 or Muto 2011.  
4.5. Trinity Reform Package 
The Trinity Reform Package focused on the fiscal system of local governments. The 
intergovernmental distribution of taxes and the LAT functionality, which were outlined in 
chapter 2.6., play an important role in this regard. The local governments are responsible for 
roughly 60% of the expenditures but only account for about 40% of the revenues through the 
local taxes. Thus, a financial equalization is necessary, which is largely achieved by the LAT 
and national disbursements.  
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Another approach is to shift the competences to impose taxes rather than to shift part of the 
tax revenues. As the name may suggest, the Trinity Reform Package included three areas, all 
aiming at decentralization. Initiated under PM Koizumi the reform plan covered the shift of 
“tax revenue sources” to local authorities, the revision of “the national treasury subsidies and 
obligatory shares”, and the LAT (Ikawa 2009: 29). The “Local Tax Law and bylaws” (set up 
on the central level) determine the level of local taxes imposed, and although local authorities 
could make changes by separate regulations on their own, this has hardly ever been the case 
(ibid.: 32). The LAT is the most important general equalization instrument (for calculation 
and share see chapter 2.6.). The national treasury disbursements are bound to a specific use, 
be it a project or a certain administrative purpose (ibid.: 33). Especially the system of 
subsidies was heavily criticized as it limits local “autonomy and independence” and reduces 
local efficiency and effectiveness (ibid.: 35). Doi and Ihori (2009: 206) stress that the central 
government was “deeply involved” in the revenue sources of local governments. They further 
remark that the Trinity Reform affected several stakeholders, giving rise to conflicts about 
how and how far decentralization should be carried out (ibid.: 207). The local governments 
were opposed by central ministries, first and foremost the MIC and the MoF (ibid.). Although 
not as steep as on the national level, the local debts showed an increase since the middle of 
the 1990s (Ikawa 2009: 34). Doi and Ihori (2009: 207) argue that the lax handling of local 
expenditures caused the deteriorated local situation. Consequently, an improvement was 
urgently needed. Interestingly, the Trinity Reform was started by a draft of the “then Minister 
of Internal Affairs and Communications” Katayama in May 2002 (Ikawa 2009: 37). The 
principle thought of his proposal was to transfer 50% “of the difference between national and 
local taxes”, i.e. seven trillion Yen (about 60,6 billion Euro or roughly 55 billion US Dollar), 
in order to reach a ratio of 1:1 (local/national taxes (ibid.). In June 2002 the “’Basic policies 
for economic and fiscal management and structural reform 2002’”, short “Basic policies 
for 2002”, were enacted (ibid.: 38). The following years brought subsequent basic policies 
and a number of reform plans and agreements “between the government and the ruling 
parties” over the Trinity Reform (ibid.).  
In the period from FY 2003 to 2006 the government reduced the amount of grants and 
increased the local revenues at the same time, in accordance with the annually endorsed 
“basic policies” and the agreements (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2008: 22). The “personal income tax” was reduced on the central level, while it was 
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increased by the same value on the “local level” (Doi and Ihori 2009: 206). The calculation of 
the LAT was simplified and the number of “non-granted bodies”, i.e. local units that do not 
receive LAT funds, was increased (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations 2008: 23). The considerable amount of national treasury disbursements was either 
changed into grants or completely abolished (a total of 4,666 trillion Yen, equalling 
about 34,19 billion Euro or 42,28 billion US Dollar) from FY 2004 to FY 2006 
(Ikawa 2009: 47).  
 
In general, the Trinity Reform did not receive high evaluation ratings by local government 
officials as it failed to fulfil the expectations of increases in the local independence and 
autonomy (ibid.: 13). In certain cases even the contrary was true. The reduction of the LAT 
posed difficulties to local authorities in the management and execution of “their financial, 
administrative and political policies” (ibid.). Features that were highly evaluated included the 
transfer of three trillion Yen to local governments in terms of “tax revenue sources”, the 
formation of a round-table for intergovernmental discussions, and the degree of 
“consolidation and rationalization” (ibid.). The main criticism is expressed about the one-
sided focus on fiscal soundness rather than on the promotion of decentralization (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the intentions of the Trinity Reform were further pursued by the “’Basic 
policies for economic and fiscal management and structural reform 2006’”, aiming at fiscal 
soundness in a three-phase concept (ibid.: 14). The first stage was designed to end with 
FY 2006, the second was scheduled from FY 2007 “to the beginning of the 2010s”, and the 
third was planned for the period until the middle of the 2010s (ibid.). 
As the local governments demand for more autonomy and responsibilities on the one hand, 
and the central government being forced to transfer some of its power and functions to the 
subordinated levels, the fiscal circumstances have to be improved on a continuous basis. This 
improvement has to be pursued with the same emphasis as the devolution of competences. 
Otherwise, the local authorities will not be able to fulfil their duties in a sustainable and 
suitable manner for their citizens.  
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5. Conclusions and Outlook 
 
The results gained throughout this thesis show that the Japanese government is rather small on 
an international scale. The majority of public employees are engaged on the local level, with 
both the central and local authorities continuously trying to decrease their number of staff 
members. The public sector shows some interesting characteristics that have been useful in 
the past, especially in the decades of economic recovery after the end of World War II. The 
bureaucracy and its relations to other important players such as businesspersons and 
politicians serve as a good example in this regard. But with changing circumstances in terms 
of international economic conditions they have been constantly losing their legitimization. In 
order to adapt to the changing economic environment and challenges emerging from 
fundamental demographic developments (ageing population, declining birthrates) the 
Japanese government has, as many others, initiated and implemented various reforms. 
 
Administrative reforms are seen as a prerequisite for all other reforms, one would thus think 
that the government would carry them out with the utmost vigour. In fact, the government has 
achieved to implement principles of the New Public Management approach, namely the 
establishment of Independent Administrative Institutions and the implementation of Policy 
Evaluation Systems in the course of its central government reform in 2001. In addition, 
privatization efforts were made. Concerning the intergovernmental relations decentralization 
was put on the agenda, with some prominent endeavours like the Trinity Reform, initiated by 
PM Koizumi. The government achieved a certain degree of consolidation on the municipal 
level with its incentives for municipal mergers.  
 
Still, there are several causes for concern. First of all, the government (especially on the 
national level) lacked a system of interim evaluation for a long time, with the instrument of 
policy evaluation only implemented about ten years ago. In other words, the results of 
measures taken were barely compared to any kind of benchmark. Wavelike movements, 
induced by a trial-and-error-based approach, rather than by consequence and assertiveness 
characterize the efforts of both administrative reform and decentralization. Secondly, as a 
rule, the process of change, i.e. reform, was initiated by symptoms of shortage and as an 
answer to pressure from outside the system. There is an intrinsic motivation to improvement 
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for sure, but it is often superposed by the intention to keep to the well-tried concepts as long 
as possible, even if in sum it would have been better to abandon the “old-fashioned” way at an 
earlier point. The same attitude has been observed in the aftermath of the bubble burst, in 
particular towards the end of the 1990s, when the government preferred to implement a 
number of economic stimulus packages of several trillions of Yen rather than to decide on far-
reaching measures to restructure certain ailing parts (especially within the banking sector). It 
must be noted here, that no one can say for sure what would have happened if different 
measures would have been taken, but the outcome that was produced leaves much room for 
improvement.  
In general, the Japanese government seems to shy away from extreme actions and the public 
rarely demands for them. In the rare cases when those measures could be pushed through (e.g. 
the privatization of the Japan Post), a complete reverse is still possible, proving the lack of 
consistency and continuity. In addition, the responsible organs, as for example the Prime 
Minister, often lack the ability to push through unpopular measures, as they are not backed by 
solid support, neither from within their party, nor from industry, labour unions, or the public. 
Over and above these facts, the bureaucracy still has considerable power and is essentially 
involved in fundamental questions such as decentralization, thus being in the position to 
weaken the impact of reforms. Consequently, many of the initially radical measure wind up as 
softened versions. The third point can be illustrated with the help of the initiatives taken 
towards the promotion of e-government, which uncover another characteristic of the Japanese 
reform efforts, namely the tendency of window-dressing instead of showing real benefits for 
citizens’ welfare. Information provided by the government often comes with the connotation 
of an image campaign. 
 
The government should therefore, in the short-run, focus on achieving greater public 
awareness for essential issues such as the enormous amount of public debts and the need to 
cut expenditures by any means. Another aim that should be achieved as soon as possible is a 
stronger position for the PM in order to be able to pursue certain unpopular measures without 
being replaced after one year latest. In the short- to medium-run the central government 
should implement a proper system of subsidiarity, giving the local governments resources and 
power, and above all trust, to tackle their problems on their own, thereby helping to improve 
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the overall conditions. Unless the central government is willing to allow for a real transfer of 
competences decentralization and its benefits will not be achieved.  
 
The answer to the research question thus is: Yes, public administration and decentralization in 
Japan will benefit from continuous reform, but only if the central government finally realizes 
that it has to fully implement the actions proposed by several advisory bodies kind of 
throughout the last decades without any exemption clauses and it has to fully implement a 
decentralized system with the local governments as its equal partners instead of using them as 
mere vicarious agents. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis deals with the Japanese administrative reforms and decentralization efforts of the 
last few decades. It outlines the general structure of the central government and its relation to 
the subordinated local levels of prefectures and municipalities.  
 
The public sector is rather small in terms of employment and GDP share compared with other 
OECD countries. The public debts, in contrast, show an alarmingly high value of about 200% 
of the Japanese GDP, by far the highest figure in the OECD comparison. Consequently, the 
Japanese government has initiated several reform efforts during the last decades. The most 
prominent are named after the Prime Ministers who launched them.  
 
The Nakasone Reform in the 1980s focused on the privatization on major public corporations. 
The privatization of the Japan National Railways is described in further detail and serves as an 
example for the 1980s privatizations. The Hashimoto Reform in the 1990s covered a whole 
range of reform contents, including the streamlining of central ministries, the promotion of 
decentralization, the establishment of Independent Administrative Institutions, and the 
implementation of Policy Evaluation Systems as part of the New Public Movement in Japan 
as described in this thesis. The Koizumi Reform in the 2000s dealt with the controversial 
privatization of the Japan Post and the fiscal decentralization, both of which are presented in 
the course of this thesis.  
 
A separate chapter is dedicated to the local governments and their struggle for more power. 
Decentralization is discussed as a theoretical concept and its implementation in Japan in the 
form of several phases of decentralization reform. Although the central government has 
continuously tried to promote the advance of decentralization it seems as if it is not fully 
convinced of this concept, as a certain back-and-forth-strategy can be observed in this context. 
It has, however, offered some incentives for municipalities to merge and thereby realize 
benefits for themselves, but also for their residents in terms of better provision of services.  
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All in all, however, the continuous reform efforts will only create benefits for public 
administration and decentralization in Japan in the long run if the government fundamentally 
modifies its approach towards the awareness and solution of problems. 
 
KEYWORDS: administrative reform, decentralization, public administration, benefits, Japan  
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit den Bemühungen der japanischen Regierungen 
der letzten Jahrzehnte in den Bereichen der Verwaltungsreformen und 
Dezentralisierungsmaßnahmen. Sie bietet einen Überblick über die grundlegende Struktur der 
zentralen Regierungseinrichtungen und deren Beziehung zu den nachgeordneten lokalen 
Ebenen der Präfekturen und Gemeinden.  
 
Der öffentliche Sektor ist relativ klein im Vergleich zu anderen OECD Staaten gemessen an 
der Anzahl an öffentlich Beschäftigten und dem Anteil am Bruttoinlandsprodukt. Mit einer 
Staatsverschuldung von alarmierenden hohen 200% des Bruttoinlandsprodukts zeigt Japan 
mit Abstand den höchsten Wert im OECD-Vergleich. Entsprechend hat die japanische 
Regierung in den letzten Jahrzehnten mehrere Versuche unternommen auf diese Situation zu 
reagieren. Die bekanntesten und umfangreichsten Bestrebungen wurden nach den 
Ministerpräsidenten benannt, durch die sie in Gang gebracht wurde.  
 
Die Reformbemühungen der 1980er waren geprägt von Premier Nakasone, der seinen Fokus 
auf die Privatisierung großer Staatsunternehmen in den Bereichen Bahn, Telekommunikation 
und Tabakmonopol legte. Beispielhaft wird aus diesem Abschnitt die Privatisierung der 
japanischen Staatsbahnen näher beschrieben. Die 1990er standen ganz im Zeichen von 
Hashimoto Ryūtarō, der während seiner Amtszeit die Reform der Zentralregierung initiierte 
und damit einhergehend die Anzahl der Ministerien verkleinerte, 
Selbstverwaltungskörperschaften etablierte und Systeme der „Policy Evaluation“ einführte. 
Zudem wurden die Dezentralisierungsvorhaben weiter vorangetrieben. Stellvertretend für die 
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Reformanstrengungen der Koizumi-Regierung werden die umstrittene Postprivatisierung und 
die Umsetzung der fiskalischen Dezentralisierung im Rahmen der „Trinity Reform“ 
beschrieben. Ein eigenes Kapitel ist der lokalen Ebene gewidmet, wobei besonderes 
Augenmerk auf den Kampf um mehr Macht und Kompetenzen gelegt wird. Dezentralisierung 
als theoretisches Konzept und dessen Umsetzung in Japan werden anhand von fünf Phasen 
seit 1945 dargestellt.  
 
Obwohl die Zentralregierung kontinuierlich ihre Dezentralisierungsvorhaben vorantreibt 
scheint sie gleichzeitig nicht vollständig von diesem Konzept überzeugt zu sein, worauf eine 
gewisse vor-und-zurück-Strategie schließen lässt. Nichtsdestotrotz wurden den Gemeinden 
Anreize für eine Zusammenlegung geboten um auf der einen Seite selbst davon zu profitieren 
und auf der anderen Seite bessere Dienstleistungen für die ansässigen BürgerInnen bieten zu 
können.  
 
Zusammenfassend ist zu sagen, dass die öffentliche Verwaltung und die 
Dezentralisierungsbestrebungen nur dann zur Gänze und langfristig von den kontinuierlich 
durchgeführten Reformen profitieren werden wenn die Regierung ihren Zugang zu 
Problembewusstsein und –lösung fundamental ändert. 
 
 
SCHLAGWÖRTER: Verwaltungsreform, Dezentralisierung, öffentliche Verwaltung, 
Vorteile, Japan  
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